# **Prison, Mental Health and Family Spillovers**

Manudeep Bhuller\*

Laura Khoury<sup>†</sup>

Katrine V. Løken<sup>‡</sup>

November 2021

**Abstract:** Does prison cause mental health problems among inmates and their family members? Correlational evidence shows that the prevalence of mental health problems is much higher in the inmate population than in the general population, but it remains silent on causality. We exploit the strengths of the Norwegian setting and the richness of the data to accurately measure the impacts of incarceration on the health of the defendants and their family members. First, we use an event-study design around the case decision event. The event study is complemented with an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that takes advantage of the random assignment of criminal cases to judges who differ in their stringency. Both methods consistently show that the positive correlation is misleading: incarceration lowers the prevalence of mental health disorders among defendants as measured by mental-health related visits to health care professionals. We further demonstrate that this effect lasts long after release and is unlikely to be driven by a shift in health care demand. Family members also experience positive spillovers on their mental health, especially spouses.

**Keywords:** mental health, incarceration, family spillovers **JEL codes:** K42, I10, I18

**Acknowledgments:** We thank seminar participants at several universities and conferences for valuable feedback and suggestions. This research was conducted as part of the ERC Starting Grant project 'Criminality, Victimization and Social Interactions' (CIVICS 757279). The project was also supported from the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence Scheme, FAIR project 262675.

<sup>\*</sup>University of Oslo, Statistics Norway, IZA, and CESifo. E-mail: manudeep.bhuller@econ.uio.no

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup>Norwegian School of Economics. E-mail: laura.khoury@nhh.no

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>‡</sup>Norwegian School of Economics, University of Bergen, Statistics Norway, IZA, and CESifo. E-mail: ka-trine.loken@nhh.no

## **1** Introduction

Mental health is a serious public health concern. In a report from the World Health Organization (WHO, 2021), depression is listed among the leading causes of disability worldwide, and especially among young adults.<sup>1</sup> Mental health is particularily a problem for inmates, where a majority of them are young male adults. For example, 37% of all prison and jail inmates had been diagnosed with a mental health problem in the US in 2012 (Bronson and Berzofsky, 2017). The situation is comparable in Norway, where a survey has found that 73% of Norwegian inmates had a personality disorder (Cramer, 2014). This is compared to about 20 % in the general Norwegian population (Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2018). Given the high prevalence of mental health problems among inmates, it is important to understand whether, and in what situations, time spent in prison can improve or exacerbate mental health problems.

The impact is a priori ambigious. On the one hand, prisons could improve mental health if prisoners get better access to health care than they could otherwise afford, having on average lower income and less formal employment. Prisons can also help inmates stay drug-free, which can also improve their mental health. On the other hand, lack of freedom, bad incarcerations conditions (overcrowding, poor hygiene and nutrition, etc.) and perhaps increased (threat of) violence in prison compared to outside could adversely affect inmates' mental health. Beyond the inmates themselves, the potential effects of prison on the inmates' mental health could spill over to the health of close family members through increased trauma, stigma or financial hardship when the partner, the parent or the child serves prison time. Prisons could also remove a negative influence from their family members' lives. Finally, potential improvements (worsening) of inmates' mental health could have direct spillovers on family members' well-being.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide causal evidence on both the effects of prison on the mental health of inmates and their family members. Identifying the causal effects of prison on mental health is challenging for several reasons. Data availability is a major challenge in this respect. The ideal dataset requires information on repeated measures of criminal behavior and health over time, which in most settings are regarded as highly sensitive data and difficult to access and link. Measuring mental health can also be challenging as the utilization of health care services could both be suggestive of mental health problems, however, it could also be preventive if it hinders more long term serious mental health issues. Another major challenge relates to correlated unobservables. Inmates both enter and exit prison with mental health problems and these could be driven by unobserved factors as opposed to the time served in prison. Finally, estimating spillovers can be even more difficult as it requires the need to link defendants to family networks of spouses and children and also deal with common environmental and demographic factors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For instance, suicide is the fourth leading cause of death among the 15-29-year-olds (WHO, 2021).

This paper draws on multiple strengths of the Norwegian setting to overcome these challenges. We link several administrative data sources and construct a panel with complete records of criminal behavior, prison time, and health status of every Norwegian from 2006-2014. Using this panel dataset, we can follow inmates for up to five years after the prison sentence, which allows us to assess their mental health outcomes over a prolonged period after release. In addition, we use two different research designs to identify the causal effect of prison. Firstly, we use an event study design that takes advantage of the variation in the criminal case decision date under the identifying assumption that the timing of the case decision is conditionally random. Secondly, we exploit a random judge design as in Bhuller et al. (2020), where we instrument prison sentencing decisions using variation in randomly assigned judges who differ systematically in their stringency. These strategies complement each other and provide two sets of causal impacts of prison on inmates' mental health for different subpopulations and under different identifying assumptions; while the event study design provides the average treatment effect (LATE). Due to precision issues with the IV design, we focus only on the event study design for heterogeneity analyses and family spillovers.

We offer three key findings. Firstly, both the event study estimates and the IV estimates show a large decrease in mental health related visits that lasts post release. In contrast, the OLS estimates show positive associations between imprisonment and subsequent mental health related visits. For instance, the event study shows that imprisonment causes a 30% decline in the probability of having a mental health visit five years after the prison sentencing decision in court.<sup>2</sup> Overall, this amounts to a 12% decline in the probability of any type of health care visits five year after sentencing.

Secondly, interpreting the evidence, we find that incapacitation can only explain a small share of the decline in mental health related visits as the impacts last and become stronger in the years after the inmate leaves prison. Furthermore, we see a decline both in addiction and depression-related diagnoses, suggesting that the impacts extend beyond de-addiction. We also find evidence consistent with our estimates reflecting an improvement in mental health and not merely a decrease in health care demand. Several pieces of evidence support this argument: first, inmates have a very high health care utilization at baseline, and do not seem to distrust the health care system. The relatively humane prison conditions in Norway make it unlikely that prison negatively affects this trust. Moreover, we also see a decline in emergency health care visits for mental health reasons and we do not see any longer run upticks in mental health diagnoses even five years after the prison sentence, which could have been consistent with the short run decline causing longer run increases in mental health problems. The absence of a decline in physical health related visits also provides a test for the hypothesis that health care seeking behavior is not affected downward.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ We estimate an 8 percentage points decrease in the monthly probability of having a mental health related visit from a baseline of 27%. By contrast, we find no meaningful impacts on non-mental health outcomes.

Lastly, there are significant spillovers to spouses who also see a large decrease in mental health related visits. Five years after case decision, only about 40% of the spouses are still together and the spillovers to spouses are driven by those that split up, suggesting that the "removal of a bad influence" channel could be at play. Children and parents also experience a decrease in mental health related visits in the longer run, albeit much smaller. We also see a reduction in child protection-related incidents in these families. Taken together, the spillover to spouses in particular and that there are fewer child protection-related incidents in these families suggests that prison can have important positive spillovers on family health and wellbeing. These findings also support our main evidence that incarcerated defendants themselves also experience improvements in their own mental health for a prolonged period after prison. The potential benefits of rehabilitation through improvements in mental health are thus large and go beyond the direct effects on the defendants.

This paper provides an important contribution to the existing literature on prison and health. Most of the current studies on this topic are correlational (Binswanger et al., 2007; Weidner and Schultz, 2019; Haglund et al., 2014; Sailas et al., 2006; Turney et al., 2012), often relying on comparisons of incarcerated and non incarcerated individuals matched on some observable characteristics such as age and gender.<sup>3</sup> This literature generally finds that incarceration is associated with higher levels of morbidity, mortality and mental health disorders. However, this positive association does not inform on whether incarceration caused poorer health outcomes, as incarcerated and non incarcerated individuals are likely to differ along unobervable dimensions. There is a scarse causal literature focusing on mortality. Norris et al. (2020) use a propsective difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy around the removal of the treatment (release from prison) on US data and show a negative effect of prison on mortality during incapacitation. The decrease is strongest for homicides and overdoses but also marked for suicides and mortality from natural causes. Although they are not able to precisely estimate the effect, they can rule out any post-release positive impact of incarceration on mortality. Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2020) use policy-induced variation at the intensive margin (prison length) and find a decrease in mortality risk, especially when they zoom in on specific subgroups or causes of death (e.g. suicide or violent death). They argue that this decrease is driven by in-prison health treatment and services. We contribute and extend the literature by using alternative research designs, focusing on the extensive margin of prison and on less extreme health outcomes.<sup>4</sup> Beyond the extreme outcome of death, we are therefore able to capture improvements or worsening of health that are susceptible to have dramatic consequences in the daily life of defendants. We also present the first evidence on family health spillovers of prison.

Related to our work is a large literature on the effect of prison on other outcomes, in particular recivism and employment. Descriptive studies (Gottfredson, 1999; Western et al., 2001) report a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>See also a recent and excellent overview article by Western, 2021

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The extensive margin makes particularly sense in the Norwegian setting where long sentences are rare.

positive correlation between imprisonment and recidivism and nonemployment. A smaller set of studies use a judge fixed effect instrument with mixed findings. On the US data, Green and Winik (2010) and Loeffler (2013) fail to detect any effect of incarceration on recidivism, while Kling et al. (1999) provides suggestive evidence of a positive though imprecise impact on labor market outcomes post release. However, Aizer and Doyle Jr (2015) and Mueller-Smith (2015) both find a negative effect of incarceration on future outcomes: Aizer and Doyle Jr (2015) measure lower high school completion rates and higher future incarceration rate on a population of juveniles while Mueller-Smith (2015) reports higher recidivism rates and worse labor market outcomes. In Ohio, Norris et al. (2021) find that incarceration reduces the number of crimes committed by the defendants over the three years following judge assignment, consistent with incapacitation effects, but do not measure any significant effect post incarceration. Their paper also closely relates to ours since they are able to examine spillovers, and reveal that the incarceration of a parent or sibling has a negative effect on the likelihood of being charged for the children, with no detectable effect on education. Using an alternative methodology relying on discontinuities in North Carolina's sentencing guidelines, Rose and Shem-Tov (2021) find that incarceration has a reoffending-reducing effect that diminishes with sentence length. In the Norwegian context, Bhuller et al. (2020) show that incarceration discourages future criminal behavior and improves future employment prospects. An assessment of the impact of incarceration on other dimensions, including health, and on the whole family, is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the effects of prison. Our paper therefore contributes to this comprehensive assessment for a better design of sanctions.

Finally our study relates to a broader literature on the causes and consequences of mental health. This literature often focuses on an adolescent population and relies on the use of sibling fixed-effects, and individual and neighborhood controls: it has been shown, for instance, that mental health problems are associated with worse education and labor market outcomes, less future mariage stability, and higher criminal activity later in life (Goodman et al., 2011; Lundborg et al., 2014; Currie and Stabile, 2006; Anderson et al., 2015; Fletcher and Wolfe, 2009).<sup>5</sup> A set of studies, taking advantage of changes in health policy or local availability of treatment, suggests a causal link between mental health and employment, human capital and criminal outcomes on an adult population (Bütikofer et al., 2020; Deza et al., 2020; Bondurant et al., 2018). For instance, exploiting family fixed-effects and a change in the treatment of bipolar disorders, Biasi et al. (2021) demonstrate the large earnings penalties entailed by mental health disorders, that are partly offset by access to treatment. Relying on a difference-in-differences, Jácome (2020) reports a positive effect of the loss in Medicaid eligibility on future criminal behavior, especially among those with mental health histories. The multidimensional impacts of mental health disorders highlight the fact

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The literature on the consequences of mental health issues among adolescents is relevant to the extent that our sample is quite young, with a median age at 31.

that a positive (negative) impact of incarceration on mental health could therefore help with (impair) rehabilitation of the inmates. Papers measuring that mental health disorders entail a higher likelihood to engage in criminal activity emphasize again the need to acount for potential reverse causality and selection in the relationship between incarceration and mental health.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional setting and data sources, while Section 3 details the methodology. Section 4 presents the results on inmates' mental health, and spillovers to family members are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Institutional Setting and Data Sources

We describe below key features of our institutional setting. Our setting is similar to the one used in Bhuller et al. (2020) to estimate the causal effects of incarceration on defendant's recidivism and future employment. We start by briefly describing the court system and how cases are assigned to judges. We then describe the prison system, and, in particular, how health care is provided in prisons. We end this section by describing our data sources and sample restrictions.

### 2.1 The Norwegian Court System

We study defendants facing trial in the criminal justice system of Norway. If the police suspect an individual of a crime, they file a formal report. A public prosecutor then decides whether the individual should be charged with a crime as well as whether the case should proceed to a court trial. About half of police reports lead to a formal criminal charge. Of these charged cases, the public prosecutor advances approximately 40% of them to a trial. The other charged cases are either dismissed, directly assigned a fine, or sent to mediation by the public prosecutor.

Of the cases which proceed to trial, approximately 60% are non-confession cases, while the remaining are cases where the defendant has confessed to the charges filed by the public prosecutor.<sup>6</sup> We focus on non-confession cases in this paper. Once a case proceeds to trial, it is assigned to a judge. If the judge finds the accused guilty, he or she can assign a combination of possible punishments which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Slightly over half of cases result in incarceration, with probation, community service and fines combined accounting for 44% of outcomes. From 2009 onwards, electronic home monitoring is an alternative to prison time and is used in 18% of cases in which defendants faced an incarceration decision.<sup>7</sup> In a small fraction of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>A defendant chooses whether to confess prior to knowing who their assigned judge will be. The absence of plea bargaining makes the interpretation of our IV estimates easier (see Dobbie et al. 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>This includes defendants who partly served prison time in combination with electronic monitoring. This policy was introduced in some regions from September 2008 and eventually implemented nationally from May 2014.

cases (5%), the defendant is found not guilty.<sup>8</sup> If multiple individuals are charged in the same case, they take part in the same trial, but can have different charges and different sentences depending on their role in the crime. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows the typical timeline of events with the average and median time between each step from the crime to the prison release for our sample of incarcerated defendants.

The law in Norway dictates that cases are assigned to judges according to the principle of randomization (NOU, 2002; Bohn, 2000). There are a few exceptions, such as for especially severe crimes or cases involving juveniles, which we exclude from our sample. To have a sample of randomly assigned cases for the same pool of judges, we limit our sample to regular judges handling non-confession cases. Regular judges are permanent civil servants (versus deputy judges who generally serve for a limited 3 year term).<sup>9</sup>

We measure the strictness of a judge based on their incarceration rate for all other cases they have handled between 2005 and 2014. There are 596 judges, each of whom have presided over an average of 241 randomly assigned court cases. To construct our judge stringency measure for the random judge design, we calculate the leave-out mean judge incarceration rate conditional on fully interacted court and year fixed effects to account for the fact that randomization occurs within the pool of available judges.

#### 2.2 The Norwegian Prison System

To ease interpretation, we briefly describe prison conditions in Norway (see kriminalomsorgen.no). Prisons emphasize rehabilitation and follow the "principle of normality" set forth by the Norwegian Correctional Services. The principle dictates that "life inside will resemble life outside as much as possible" and that "offenders shall be placed in the lowest possible security regime." It means that the punishment is the restriction of liberty, and that no other rights should be taken away from inmates serving time in Norwegian prisons.

There are a total of 61 prisons in Norway. The largest prison (in Oslo) has 392 cells, while the smallest has 13. Norway has a strict policy of one prisoner per cell and tries to place prisoners close to home (to extent possible) so that inmates can maintain links with their families. Further, there exists two types of prisons, based on their level of security. A high-security prison (also referred to as a closed prison) has a wall or high fence around the prison area. All doors are essentially locked. When the inmates are not at work, at school or participating in leisure activities under the control

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The justice system in Norway further allows for forced psychiatric care/confinement ("tvungen psykisk helsevern") as part of the sentencing guideliens. However, these sentences are rarely given (only 44 forced confinements were made in 2020) and often relate to extreme cases such as murder or severe violence, which are some of the exceptional cases that are non-randomly assigned to judges and thus excluded from our sample. See more on this below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>We further restrict the dataset to judges who handle at least 50 randomly assigned cases and to courts which have at least two regular judges in a given year.

of the prison guards, they are locked up in their cells.<sup>10</sup> Closed prisons make up almost 70% of all prison beds in Norway. Prisons with lower security levels (also referred to as open prisons) have fewer physical security measures than prisons with high security levels, but they usually have a fence around the prison area, and inmates are not allowed to leave the facility.<sup>11</sup> Inmates in open prisons have more freedoms and responsibilities compared to closed prisons. Whether a convicted defendant is initially sent to an open or closed prison depends both on the severity of the crime, as well as geographical proximity and available space at open versus closed prisons. The two types of prisons create a separation between minor and more hardened criminals, at least until the hardened criminals have demonstrated good behavior. While more serious offenders serve the majority of their sentence in closed prisons, they are usually transferred to open prisons for resocialization and further rehabilitation before release.

To promote and facilitate rehabilitation, prisons commonly offer education, mental health and training programs. The mental-health programs are targeted at social or emotional skills, such as anger management programs, interpersonal relationship programs, programs against recidivism or drug addiction. Between 2009 and 2014, around 28% and 36% of inmates in open and closed prisons, respectively, participated in some type of mental-health program. The most common programs are for high school and work-related training although inmates can also take other miscellaneous courses. Closed prisons are also more likely to have formal employment and education programs (82.5% vs. 79% and 74.3% vs. 58.8%, respectively). All inmates are involved in some type of regular daily activity, unless they have a serious mental or physical disability. If they are not enrolled in an educational or training program, they must work within prison.<sup>12</sup> All inmates have the right to daily physical exercise and access to a library and newspapers. After release, there is an emphasis on helping offenders reintegrate into society, with access to programs set up to help ex-convicts find a job and access social services like housing support.

### 2.3 Health Care in Prison

By law, prisoners have the same rights to health care services as the population-at-large. Norwegian prisons follow the "import model", which means that all public care and health services should be provided inside prison in the same conditions as outside (Moe, 2018). By guaranteeing access to services in prison that are "as good as outside", Norwegian prisons seek to avoid disruption in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Moreover, the cells in closed prisons are examined by the staff once a day, and the number of items such as books, CDs, etc. that the inmates are allowed to have in the cell is limited.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The prison buildings are locked at night, but the inmates are not locked in the cells. Inmates can share rooms with others, and a great emphasis is placed on the possibility of contact with the rest of society through various types of outings, visiting arrangements and more lenient control measures. There are several options for using the phone, but calls can be intercepted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>All prisoners, whether working or participating in training or education programs, receive a small stipend while in prison (around \$8 per day in 2015).

the quality of health care provision. In addition, these services are delivered from the community to prisons, by local and municipal providers. This allows a better continuity upon release, as inmates have already established contact with these public service providers. Health care is part of these services, meaning that inmates may be already familiar with some health care professionals practising in their municipality or region, making it easier to consult them upon release.

The Norwegian Directorate of Health is responsible for managing health programs for inmates. Following the import model, prison health workers are financially and administratively independent from the correctional facility and the Department of Justice, and funded through the Department of Health and Social Welfare. The medical staff is often specifically trained in addictions and mental health disorders.<sup>13</sup> Kjelsberg et al. (2006) provide a description of mental health consultations offered in six medium to large Norwegian prisons representing 1/3 of the Norwegian prison population in 2005: within the first weeks of incarceration, all new prisoners are screened for possible health problems by a primary health worker. They first run a personal interview and then provide treatment and refer to specialist services if needed. Each inmate is assigned one prison officer as his or her primary contact, who will be in charge of arranging a consultation with a primary health care worker if needed. Then, if deemed necessary, the primary health worker arranges a psychiatric consultation for the inmate. In the six studied prisons, there was about one psychotherapist per 100 inmates, on top of the administative staff and primary health workers.<sup>14</sup>

### **2.4** Comparisons to Other Countries

Along many dimensions, the Norwegian criminal justice system looks similar to most Western European countries, and, to a lower extent, to the US. In Norway, the incarceration rate was equal to 72 per 100,000 in 2015, close to the rate in Western European countries that lies around 100 per 100,000 (World Prison Brief, Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research). The US is an outlier in that respect, as its incarceration rate was equal to 672 per 100,000 in 2015, while only 11 countries in the world had a rate above 400.

While Norway shows many similarities with other Western European countries and the US in terms of inmate population's characteristics (Aebi et al. (2015); Carson (2015); Kristoffersen (2014); Raphael and Stoll (2013)), it differs regarding prison expenditures and prison conditions. Similar to Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, Norway spends about \$118 thousand per inmate per year, which is almost the double of what is spent on average in Western European countries (\$66 thousand per inmate per year), and four times what is spent in the US (\$31 thousand).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>According to the Norwegian Directorate of Health, around 60% of nurses have received a specific training to handle these issues, and prisons have access to psychologists or psychotherapists.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>None of the surveyed psychotherapists had a waiting list at the time of the study, suggesting that there was enough capacity to meet the demand.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Although there is substantial heterogeneity within the US, from \$60 thousand in the state of New York to \$17

As a consequence, Norway is able to ensure better prison conditions, with an emphasis on rehabilitation and the principle of normality rather than punishment and the removal of privileges (Bhuller et al., 2018).<sup>16</sup> Some of these conditions may play a crucial role in mediating the impact of prison on health. Norwegian cells are individual, and prisons are not overcrowded.<sup>17</sup> This may particularly matter since identifying mental-health issues entails allocating specific resources to the mentally-ill inmates, including space resources, that are not necessarily available in case of overcrowding. Detecting signs of a worsening mental health condition also requires a close monitoring from the prison staff, which is made easier with a low inmate-to-staff ratio and the reduced physical barriers in Norwegian prisons.<sup>18</sup> Overcrowding, lack of resources and staff have been highlighted as potential factors explaining that mentally-ill inmates are often undiagnosed in US prisons (Haney, 2017).<sup>19</sup> Prisons in the US also offer job training, education and drug treatment programs. However, those offered in the US are often not accessible in practice due to lack of funding, and long waiting lists (Davis et al. 2014; GAO, 2012). Finally, the Norwegian system provides an intensive post-release support, e.g., active labor market programs specifically designed for ex-convicts, housing support, social assistance, disability insurance, etc.<sup>20</sup>

### 2.5 Data

Our analysis employs several data sources that we can link through unique identifiers for each individual. Information on the court cases comes from the Norwegian Courts Administration. The main dataset contains information for all court cases over the period 2005-2014. We observe the start and end dates of every trial, various case characteristics, the verdict, and unique identifiers for both judges, defendants, and district courts. We link this information with administrative data that contain complete records for all criminal charges, including the type of crime, when it took place,

thousand in Alabama. Cost estimates are calculated by dividing total prison budgets by number of prisoners. The numbers for Western Europe are for the year 2013 and are purchasing power parity adjusted (Aebi et al., 2015). The data for 40 U.S. states with available data are for 2010 (Henrichson and Ruth Delaney, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>This approach does not only determine prison conditions but also potentially creates a different culture with more interpersonal trust and closeness between inmates and correctional staff, which could help in the identification of symptoms and treatment of mental disorders.

 $<sup>1^{7}</sup>$ The occupancy rate is equal to 76% in Norway, which ranks at the lower end of the highest occupancy rate distribution (42<sup>nd</sup> out of the 57 European countries that appear in the /www.prisonstudies.org). The US rate is at 99.8%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>In 2016, the number of personnel in adult prisons per 100,000 inhabitants was equal to 96.5 in Norway, which ranks  $6^{th}$  out of the 33 European countries for which we have data (Eurostat).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Overcrowding that came with the era of mass incarceraton in the US has also triggered the rise of a punitive mind-set with the use of harsher discipline, e.g. segregative placement and solitary confinement (Haney, 2017). These negative forms of institutional control may place the mental health of inmates in jeopardy by increasing the level of stress, anger and psychological pain, and decreasing social contact.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>On the contrary, offenders in the US are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits upon release, have little access to public housing (Council of Economic Advisers, 2016), and are often denied access to food stamps, leading to higher rates of recidivism (Tuttle, 2019).

and suspected offenders. This data can be additionally linked to the prison register with information on actual time spent in prison.

We merge the court data to administrative registers provided by Statistics Norway, using a rich longitudinal database that covers every resident from 1967 to 2019. For each year, it contains individual demographic information (including sex, age, and number of children), socioeconomic data (such as years of education, earnings, employment), as well as geographical and firm identifiers. Finally, we link these data to a registry of all health care visits and their associated diagnosis codes for the years 2006-2019. This registry is filled by health care professionals to handle reimbursement claims to the national health insurance system.<sup>21</sup> The database stores information about the health care provider (type of practice, specialty, municipality of practice), the patient (identification number, date of birth, municipality of residence, sex, age, diagnosis), the date and time of the visit, and the reimbursement rate and deductible paid by the patient.

As in Bhuller et al. (2020), to ensure validity of the random judge design, we restrict the sample to randomly allocated non-confession cases by regular judge. Our main estimation sample uses cases decided between 2006 and 2014 so that each defendant's health outcomes can be followed for up to five years after decision, while the judge stringency instrument is based on the entire period from 2005 to 2014. Our baseline estimation sample includes 59,560 cases, 37,934 unique defendants, and 596 judges.

The main outcome variables we examine are the total number of health care visits or the probability of any health care visit over a given period. We further decompose this outcome into mental health or physical health-related visits. This categorization is based on the diagnosis codes associated to each visit, that follow international classifications. Diagnosis codes give the reason of the visit, even when it is not a first-time diagnosis. It means that, after a patient has been diagnosed with a certain disease for the first time, the follow-up visits for the same disease are also going to be associated with the same diagnosis code. Each visit can be associated to one or multiple codes, and we use all of them in our definition. It implies that a visit associated with multiple codes related to a physical-health and a mental-health issue will be defined both as a physical health and a mental health-related visit. The international classifications used are the International Classification of Diseases ( $10^{th}$  version) and the International Classification of Primary Care ( $2^{nd}$  version).<sup>22</sup>

Mental health visits are defined as visits associated with a code in the psychological category of the international classifications, or with a code whose label includes some specific words such as "depression", "suicide", "addiction", etc.<sup>23</sup> Given the distribution of mental health diagnoses

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>For each contact a patient has with a publicly-funded health care provider, a bill is sent to the Norwegian Health Economics Administration (HELFO).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>More information can be found here and here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>In practice, 99.9% of mental health visits defined this way are associated to a code entering the psychological category of the international classification.

(see Table A1 in Appendix A), we further decompose mental health visits into addiction and nonaddiction-related subcategories. The "addiction" category includes all substance abuse related visits whereas the "other" category gathers all the other mental health diagnoses. Substance abuse visits account for about 48.5% of mental-health visits,<sup>24</sup> and mainly correspond to drug abuse, but also alcohol, medication and stimulant abuse (Table A2). The "other" category mainly consists of depression, anxiety and stress-related diagnoses (see Table A3).<sup>25</sup> For simplicity, we will hereafter refer to this category as mood-disorder diagnoses, although the category is actually broader. Physical health visits are defined as visits associated with a code not belonging to the mental health category. Table A4 in Appendix A indicates that the most common diagnoses in this category are very often either general or related to a musculoskeletal disorder.

#### 2.6 Descriptive Statistics

Table A6 in Appendix A provides descriptive statistics for our main sample. Overall, defendants in our sample are young, very frequently male, low-educated and with a high rate of unemployment. About half of the cases in our sample are sentenced to prison, and more than one quarter of the cases involve a violent crime. Economic crimes, property crimes and drug crimes make up slightly more than 10% each of the crimes. Prison sentences are usually short, with a median at 6 months (a full distribution of sentence length can be found in Appendix A, Figure A2). Interestingly, health care utilization is high among defendants, with 90% of them having at least one health care visit the year preceding the crime, and 50% of them having more than eight visits over that same time period. Mental health problems are also highly prevalent, with 54% of the sample having at least one mental health visit the year preceding the crime. Table A7 (Appendix A) provides the same statistics on the event-study sample, where we restrict to cases sentenced to prison in 2009-2014. This sample is quite similar to our main sample, with a slightly higher proportion of men, and a higher likelihood of having been charged in the five years before the crime.

Table A5 compares the prevalence of health care visits in the sample and in the general population for the year 2010. Columns 3 to 5 systematically show significant differences, even when controling for age and gender. Column 5 reports standardized coefficients: in 2010, the sample of defendants had, on average, a 1.1 standard-deviation higher number of mental health visits (i.e., five) than the general population. The difference is lower for physical health visits, down to 0.3 standard deviation.

Table A8 provides detailed descriptive statistics on the distribution of different types of health care visits in the sample. It reports the average monthly probability and number of visits computed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>As measured in the dataset of all health care visits of our sample of defendants in 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>This categorization is also based on descriptive studies run in Norwegian prisons that find that substance use, depression, anxiety, and personality disorders are the most prevalent mental disorders (Kjelsberg et al., 2006).

over the months 30 to 36 before the crime. It confirms the high prevalence of mental health visits, with an average probability of having at least one mental health visit in a given month of 20%. Among mental health visits, the most common reasons are for substance abuse (that includes any type of substance, such as alcohol, drug, medication, etc.), severe mood disorder (i.e., depression) and light mood disorder (i.e., anxiety, stress or sleep disturbance). Differences between defendants sentenced to prison and not sentenced to prison after the case decision are of small magnitudes, and indicate that incarcerated defendants have a slightly higher prevalence of mental health problems.

Overall, the descriptive statistics support the idea that the population of defendants is negatively selected in terms of health, calling for the use of econometric methods dealing with this selection. They also point to a high health care utilization in the sample of defendants, despite a less favorable socio-economic status.<sup>26</sup>

## **3** Methodology

To evaluate the causal impact of incarceration on the health of the defendants and their family we use two different methodologies. We start by presenting the two-way fixed-effect methodology that accounts for unobserved permanent heterogeneity by including case-by-defendant fixed effects and common time effects, relying effectively on variation in the timing of court decisions. We then describe how we exploit the random assignment of cases to judges in an instrumental variable (IV) strategy.

## 3.1 Event Study Design

Our first methodology relies on an event study that compares the evolution of the outcome of defendants incarcerated at different points in time. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to cases of incarcerated defendants decided between 2009 and 2014 to be able to observe outcomes three years before case decision. We define the event as the incarceration decision<sup>27</sup> and estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha_{ic} + \sum_{\substack{j=-36\\ j\neq -1}}^{60} \beta_j D_j + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
(1)

where  $Y_{i,t}$  is the outcome variable (e.g. number of health-care visits) in month t for individual  $i, D_i$  are dummies measuring the distance to the month of court's incarceration decision (i.e., the

 $<sup>^{26}</sup>$ We come back to the distinction between health and health care utilization in Section 4.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>The time of the incarceration decision is chosen as it complements the timing for the IV strategy presented below. Alternatives to the incarceration decision includes the time of the crime and we will provide robustness to main findings using time of crime as the running variable.

event),  $\alpha_{ic}$  are case-by-defendant fixed effects, and  $\gamma_t$  are common calendar time (month × year) effects. By including case-by-defendant fixed effects, we control for all the factors that are time invariant at the individual and case level. Calendar month × year fixed effects account for the common influence of time trends on the defendant's outcome.

The event study relies on the identification assumption that the timing of the court decision is random, conditional on  $\alpha_{ic}$  and  $\gamma_t$ . Under this assumption, an OLS estimation of the equation (1) will provide estimates of  $\hat{\beta}_j$  that can be interpreted as the average treatment effect at month *j* since the case decision event for defendants that were incarcerated. However, since we only include incarcerated individuals in the event study estimation (no never-treated units),<sup>28</sup> we can run into the issues related to (i) under-identification, (ii) negative weights, and (iii) identification of long-run causal effects, as highlighted by Borusyak et al. (2021). We therefore implement the methodology they propose in all our two-way fixed-effects (TWFE) estimations.<sup>29</sup>

A potential threat to identification could come from co-occurring influences of events that precede the event of incarceration. In our context, the event of incarceration is always preceded by the events of crime and onset of trial. If defendants' health outcomes are also affected by the events of crime and trial onset, then one could expect changes in defendant outcomes already prior to incarceration. A visual inspection of pre-trends from the event studies can be informative about the presence of such influences. We return to this in Section 4.3, where we also provide robustness checks by alternating the reference points used in the event studies.

### 3.2 Random Judge Design

We complement the event study design with an IV strategy that takes advantage of random assignment of cases to judges as in Bhuller et al. (2020). We are interested in estimating the following relationship:

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_t I_{i,0} + X'_i \theta_t + v_{i,t}$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>We could have included non-incarcerated defendants as never-treated units in our estimation, but the likely selection into incarceration makes it a non-suitable control group. Indeed, even if we condition on committing a crime, being incarcerated is likely correlated with the severity of the crime, for instance, which could influence health outcomes on top of the effect of incarceration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>The under-identification refers to the fact that, in the absence of never-treated units and when unit and time fixed effects are included, it is impossible to point identify the distance to event dummies  $D_j$  in the fully dynamic specification. In addition, in the 'static' specification where all pre and post event distance dummies are aggregated into a binary post variable, long-run effects are associated to negative weights because it is implicitly assumed that the effect of each period is constant. Finally, this also leads to a spurious identification of the long-run effects since no non-treated unit can serve as a reference group in the last period. We therefore implement the methodology and associated Stata package *did\_imputation* developed by Borusyak (2021). See Borusyak et al. (2021) for further details.

where  $\beta_t$  is the coefficient of interest,  $I_{i,0}$  is an indicator equal to 1 if individual *i* has been sentenced to prison at time 0 (normalized to be the time of the court decision), and  $Y_{i,t}$  is the outcome variable (e.g. number of health care visits) measured in time *t* after individual *i*'s court decision. As randomization of judges to cases occurs within the pool of available judges within a court-by-year cell, we always include fully interacted court-by-year fixed effects among the vector of controls  $X'_i$ .

An OLS estimation of Equation (2) can raise concerns of selection bias, as defendants that are incarcerated and defendants that are not are unlikely to be comparable. Indeed Table A8 in Appendix A confirms that incarcerated and unincarcerated defendants differ along many of their observed background characteristics. The random judge design addresses this concern by exploiting that cases are conditionally randomly assigned to judges and that some judges are systematically more stringent that others. Taken together, this leads to as-good-as random variation in the probability a defendant will be incarcerated depending on which judge the case is assigned to. We utilize this exogenous variation in  $I_{i,0}$  to draw inference about the causal effects of incarceration on defendant health. Our main analysis is based on 2SLS estimation of  $\beta_t$  with Equation (2) as the second stage equation and a first stage equation specified as:

$$I_{i,0} = \gamma Z_{j(i)} + X'_i \delta + \eta_{i,0} \tag{3}$$

where  $Z_{j(i)}$  is the leave-out mean incarceration stringency of judge *j* assigned to handle the case of individual *i*.<sup>30</sup> Under the assumptions of instrument exogeneity and monotonicity, the 2SLS estimand can be interpreted as a positive weighted average of the causal effect of incarceration among the subgroup of defendants who are more likely to receive to an incarceration decision if their case is assigned to a stricter judge, and vice versa. It means that, unlike the event study, the IV approach gives an estimate of the effect of incarceration on the population of compliers. To gain precision in the IV regressions, we include, on top of the court-by-year fixed effects, a rich set of background characteristics capturing defendants' demographics, type of crime, past work and criminal history as part of the vector of control variables  $X'_i$ .

The validity of our IV strategy requires that the instrument is relevant, i.e., that the judge stringency has a significant impact on the incarceration probability of defendants. Table A10 in Appendix reports first-stages estimates both with and without a rich set of control variables. First stage estimates are stable across specifications and years after the decision in court. For a 10 percentage point increase in judge stringency, the probability for a defendant of being incarcerated increases by around 3.6 percentage point on average.

For our instrument to be valid, the stringency of a judge must be uncorrelated with both de-

 $<sup>^{30}</sup>$ As described in Section 2.1, we calculate judge stringency as the leave-out mean judge incarceration rate for all randomly assigned cases each judge has handled over the 2005-2014 period, including both past and future confession and non-confession cases.

fendant and case characteristics that could affect a defendant's future outcomes (controlling for fully interacted court and year dummies). Table A11 tests the assumption of random assignment of cases to judges. The results show that demographic, type of crime, past work and criminal history variables are highly predictive of a defendant incarceration probability. When running the same regression on the judge stringency instrument instead yields very few significant coefficients. The three significant coefficients are of very low magnitude, and the whole set of included variables is not jointly significant. This provides strong evidence that criminal court cases are randomly assigned in our sample, conditional on fully interacted court and year fixed effects. Figure A3 in Appendix A further supports the randomization assumption: it shows that the is no systematic correlation between the predicted number of health-care visits in months *t* to t+12 after case decision computed using the same set of covariates as the ones included in Table A11 and the judge stringency instrument.

The conditional random assignment of cases to judges is sufficient for a causal interpretation of the reduced form impact of being assigned to a stricter judge on defendant outcomes. However, interpreting the IV estimates as measuring the causal effect of incarceration requires an exclusion restriction: the incarceration rate of the judge should affect the defendant's outcomes only through the incarceration sentencing channel and not directly in any other way. Furthermore, with heterogeneous effects, monotonicity must also be assumed. As the random judge design is identical to the one used in Bhuller et al. (2020), we refer to Section IV.B in that paper for additional discussions of exclusion and monotonicity assumptions in this context.<sup>31</sup>

## **4** The Impacts of Incarceration on Defendant Health

We now provide evidence on the impacts of incarceration on defendants' mental health using the event study design and the random judge design discussed in Section 3.

#### 4.1 Main Results

We start by estimating Equation (1) on the monthly panel of incarcerated defendants with cases decided between 2009 and 2014, following each defendant across the 36 months before and the 60 months after court decision. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the results from this event study, where we plot the coefficient estimates of the time to event dummies  $\hat{\beta}_t$  along with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>There may be a variety of reasons why a judge is more or less likely to incarcerate. While we do not observe personal characteristics of judges in our data for privacy reasons, we can measure how many cases they have handled. Using an OLS regression with the same controls as in Table A11, we find no relationship between the number of cases handled and judge stringency in our baseline sample. While other characteristics may influence the likelihood of incarcerating, as long as the randomization of cases holds, it should not matter for our analysis.

the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.<sup>32</sup> These coefficient estimates should be interpreted as showing the effects of being incarcerated at time zero, relative to the pre-event period.




Figure 1: The Effects of Incarceration on Health Care Visits.

Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

We first consider whether a defendant had any visits to a health care provider in a given month, irrespective of the nature of the visit or the type of health diagnosis used. Figure 1a indicates that there are no changes in the probability of a health care visit prior to the incarceration event, and large, persistent and statistically significant reductions post event. At 60 months after the incarceration event, incarcerated defendants have a 6 percentage points lower probability of a health care visit, which compared to the pre-event mean of 49 percent suggests a 12 percent reduction.

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$ As we include both time and unit fixed effects in the event study specification, for the graphical representation of the event dummies, we exclude two time to event dummies in order to separately identify calendar time effects from the time to event effects (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2017). We exclude both the first time to event dummy (i.e.,  $36^{th}$  month before the court decision) and the last one before the event (i.e., one month before the court decision).

A. Probability of Mental Health Visit					
	OLS	TWFE	IV		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Months 1–12	0.018***	-0.035***	-0.192*		
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.104)		
Dependent Mean	0.25	0.25	0.25		
Months 13–60	0.037***	-0.069***	-0.096		
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.086)		
Dependent Mean	0.25	0.25	0.25		
B. Number of Mental Health Visits					
	OLS	TWFE	IV		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Months 1–12	0.033***	-0.083***	-0.915**		
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.412)		
Dependent Mean	0.61	0.61	0.61		
Months 13–60	0.115***	-0.133***	-0.679*		
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.360)		
Dependent Mean	0.66	0.63	0.66		
Controls:					
Demographics			$\checkmark$		
Type of Crime			$\checkmark$		
Past Work & Crime History			$\checkmark$		
Case x Individual FE		$\checkmark$			
Period FE		$\checkmark$			
Court x Case Entry Year FE			$\checkmark$		

Table 1: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health.

*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014. Standard errors are clustered at case level in the OLS and TWFE estimations, while they are two-way clustered at the judge and defendant level in the IV estimation. 95% confidence intervals. The table reports the estimates of the effect of being incarcerated on the probability (Panel A) and number (Panel B) of mental health visits. Column (1) reports the estimates from the OLS without controls or fixed effects, while column (2) reports the estimates from the TV where the prison indicator is instrumented with the strigency score of the judge the case has been assigned to, and where we control for demographics (age, sex, foreign-born status, number of children, marital status, level of education), type of crime, past work and crime history (indicator for being employed in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcerated in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator in the sample included in the regression.\*pc-0.1, \*\*pc-0.5, \*\*\*pc-0.1.

Next, we decompose health care visits depending on whether the visit related to a mental health problem or whether it related to a non-mental health problem. Focusing on mental health-related visits in Figure 1b, we again find negligible changes in the probability of a mental health visit prior to the event, and large, persistent and statistically significant reductions post event. In relative terms, we find that incarcerated defendants experience an almost 30 percent reduction in the probability of a mental health visit at 60 months after the event, when we compare the estimated 8 percentage points reduction to the pre-event mean of 27 percent. By contrast, we do not find any meaningful impacts on the probability of a physical (non-mental) health visit beyond a reduction in the first 12 months. We return to an interpretation of this temporary reduction in Section 4.2 below.

In the following, we focus exclusively on mental health-related visits. Table 1 provides results from two-way fixed effects (TWFE) and random judge estimations, along with standard OLS estimates. Panel A shows estimates for the probability of a mental health visit per month, while Panel B shows estimates for the number of monthly mental health visits. In each panel, we further distinguish between health visits that take place during months 1–12 and months 13–60 after the event, respectively. Comparing columns (1)-(3), we find striking differences between the positive OLS estimates reported in column (1) and the negative TWFE and IV estimates in columns (2)-(3), which indicate that incarceration lowers the probability of a mental health visit. Consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Section 2.6, the OLS estimates suggest that mental health visits are more common among incarcerated defendants. By comparison, the TWFE estimates show significant reductions in both the probability of having at least one mental health visit per month and the average number of monthly mental health visits. Finally, the IV estimates also indicate strong reductions in mental health visits.

The contrasts between the different sets of estimates in Table 1 is informative about the importance of selection bias in observational comparisons of incarcerated and unincarcerated defendants. The positive OLS estimates reported in column (1) are likely due to selection bias–incarcerated defendants have worse health outcomes compared to unincarcerated defendants, not because the former faced incarceration and the latter didn't but since the two groups also differ in background characteristics, either observed or unobserved, that correlate with their health. Once permanent individual characteristics are accounted for–as in the TWFE estimates in column (2)–the incarceration effect estimates change signs and become negative. The latter finding indicates that incarceration may instead reduce the mental health adversities facing incarcerated defendants. When we rather rely on cross-sectional comparisons between incarcerated and unincarcerated defendants who otherwise are identical along their observed or unobserved background characteristics–as in the random judge estimates in column (3)–we again reach the conclusion that incarceration improves defendants' mental health outcomes.

In terms of magnitude, the effect is large. Using the TWFE coefficient over the five years after case decision, a back of the enveloppe computation leads to an estimate of about 0.5 mental health related visits per year per inmate that did not occur because of incarceration. This can be compared to the average number of mental health related visits per inhabitant per year in the general population, that is equal to 0.96 in 2010.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, we note that the IV point estimates in Table 1, column (3), are substantially higher than the corresponding TWFE estimates in column (2), albeit the former also have larger standard errors. There are at least two possible explanations for these differences in point estimates. First,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>Another way to benchmark our result is to compare it to other interventions that impacted mental health. For instance, in Baicker et al. (2013), the authors take advantage of the Oregon experiment where Medicaid coverage was randomly allocated to people on the waiting list with a lottery. Using the lottery as an instrument for actual Medicaid enrolment, they measure a 30% decrease in the likelihood of a positive depression screening. Although the context and measure of mental health (using a eight-question version of the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-8)) are different, it suggests that our effect is sizable.

under heterogeneous treatment effects and monotonicity in judicial decision-making, the IV estimates provide the local average treatment effect for compliers who are incarcerated solely because their case was assigned to a strict judge and who otherwise would have remained unincarcerated (Angrist and Imbens, 1994). By constrast, the TWFE estimates provide the average treatment effect on the treated. Thus, if compliers have larger mental health responses to being incarcerated than do always-takers, then such effect heterogeneity could appear in the IV and TWFE estimates. Second, while the IV estimates rely on conditional randomization of similar cases to judges that differ in their stringency, the TWFE estimates effectively rely on changes in outcomes pre- and post-event for incarcerated defendants, conditional on their permanent characteristics and common calendar time effects. Even if defendants that are incarcerated at different times have similar trends in the outcomes prior to the event, one concern could be that there are contemporaneous shocks that occur at the same time as the incarceration event, e.g., job displacement, family disruption, victimization, etc., which may also influence defendants' health outcomes and thus confound the effects of incarceration. On the contrary, to the extent that such events are contemporary to or correlated with but not caused by incarceration, the IV estimates purge their influence on health outcomes.

## 4.2 Interpreting the Evidence

We now discuss possible mechanisms behind the negative effects of incarceration on mental health.

**Incapacitation.** One possible explanation for the observed drop in mental health visits immediately after the incarceration event is that when inmates are incapacitated they might also be more restrained from accessing out-of-prison health services.<sup>34</sup> If reductions in mental health visits are driven solely by such incapacitation effects, then one would expect to find only temporary drops over the duration of prison spell, and no differences beyond this. By contrast, the negative effects on monthly mental health visits reported in Figure 1b extend up to five years post incarceration decision, with gradually stronger effects as we move further away from the incarceration event. This evidence thus lends strong support against drops in mental health visits being driven mainly by prisoner incapacitation.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, prison sentences are rather short in Norway, and the median

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Note that inmates in Norwegian prisons have equal rights to public health services as the population at large (Moe, 2018). However, the health care (KUHR) database that we have access to primarily covers out-of-prison public health services, besides health services procured by the prison authorities from out-of-prison practitioners for inmates that require such special services. Standard in-prison health services or check-ups are usually not recorded in this database. To the extent that such in-prison health services substitute for out-of-prison health services, one would expect a decline in health care utilization measures based on the KUHR database during the period inmates are incarcerated.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Another argument could be that even the persistent reductions in mental health visits result from the incapacitation effects of *future* incarceration. Underlying this reasoning is that prison begets future crime, rather than deterring it, and thus also leads to higher risks of future incarceration. On the contrary, Bhuller et al. (2020) find that incarceration reduces future crime in our context, with no meaningful impacts on future incarcerations.

length is at six months, and the vast majority of inmates have a sentence of a year or less (see Figure A2). We reach the same conclusion based on the evidence in Table 1, where we split the window of observation to be the first year and then the ensuing four years post incarceration. By contrast, the temporary decline in physical health visits and no significant differences beyond the first year that we found in Figure 1c could possibly be attributed to incapacitation effects.

**De-addiction.** Drug use is highly prevalent among prison populations; survey evidence for Norwegian inmates suggests that almost 6 out of 10 inmates consumed illegal drugs in the month prior to the prison spell served at the time of interview (Friestad and Kjelsberg, 2009). To help inmates suffering from substance abuse, the Norwegian correctional services provide extensive de-addiction prison programs, besides maintaining provisions for open prisons and offering prison work, education and other rehabilitation services (see Section 2.2). Thus, one possible explanation for the observed drop in mental health visits could be that spending time in prison helps former inmates recover from drug-related problems, implying that they need fewer addiction-related treatments post release. Substance abuse is also widely recognized as being strongly associated with mental health problems (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2020). To the extent drug-related problems impair mental health, e.g., by causing depression, mood disorder, etc., one may also expect fewer visits related to such mental health problems among former inmates. Similarly, if prison directly improves inmates' mental health, then this may collaterally reduce their tendency of substance abuse.




Figure 2: The Effects of Incarceration on Addiction and Depression.

Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

To investige these channels, we decompose our measures of mental health visits into visits that strictly relate to addiction or drug use and visits that relate to regular mental health diagnoses such as depression, mood disorders, suicidal tendencies, etc. Figure 2a shows large, persistent and statistically significant reductions in addiction-related visit to health care providers. At 60 months

post incarceration, there is almost a 40 percent decline in the probability of addiction-related visits, comparing the 6 percentage points estimate to the pre-event mean of 14.6 percent. Further, Figure 2a shows equally large reductions in regular mental health visits related to depression, mood disorder, etc. This evidence suggests that the drop in mental health visits extends beyond de-addiction, either because incarceration directly improves former inmates' mental health (which possibly also lowers their tendency of substance abuse) or because de-addiction improves general mental health.

**Health care utilization.** Another interpretation of the observed drop in mental health visits is that this reflects a reduction in former inmates' demand for health care services rather than a mental health improvement per se. For instance, one can argue that inmates demand fewer health care services after release as incarceration weakens their institutional trust and leads to animosity against public authorities. In the context of Norwegian prisons that offer relatively human prison conditions and maintain equal rights to public health services for inmates as the population at large, one might expect such effects to be less pronounced. While the descriptive evidence (Table A6) suggests that our prison population generally maintains high levels of health care utilization before and after prison, to test for this mechanism we utilize detailed diagnoses attached to each health care visit. Specifically, we consider the events of mental health emergencies (e.g., suicide attempt, acute stress disorder, etc.) and any health emergencies (i.e., either mental or physical health emergency). We envision that health emergencies more often capture changes in health conditions or behavior and not any health care demand effects that could exist holding constant individiuals' health condition.

Table 2 shows the event-study estimates of the effects of incarceration on the probabilities (Panel A) and numbers (Panel B) of mental health emergency and any health emergency, respectively. In both cases, we find reductions in health emergencies after the incarceration event, and the negative effects persist beyond the first 12 months after the event.<sup>36</sup> These results again support our main finding that incarceration improves the mental health of inmates after release.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Figures showing the time profile of incarceration effects on health emergencies can be found in Appendix A (Figures A4a-A4b). Unlike the health outcomes we have consider so far, we also find some increases in health emergencies in the 12 month period prior to the incarceration event. In the period before the 12 month period prior to the incarceration event, however, there are no differences in health emergencies. One interpretation of such pre-event effects could be that incarcerated defendants changed their risk behavior (e.g., commit more crime) in the months leading up to the incarceration event, which also increased their risk of experiencing health emergencies. As noted earlier, one way to address the concern of such pre-event effects is to shift the pre-event window to before the on-set of pre-event behavioral changes. We return to this point below when we discuss the robustness of our findings. In either case, we note sharp and persistent declines in the probabilities of health emergencies after the incarceration event.

A. Probability of A	Any Visit	
	Any Health Emergency Visit	Mental Health Emergency Visit
	(1)	(2)
Months 1–12	-0.032***	-0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Dependent Mean	0.08	0.03
Months 13-60	-0.056***	-0.032***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Dependent Mean	0.08	0.03
B. Number of Visi	ts	
	Any Health Emergency Visit	Mental Health Emergency Visit
	(1)	(2)
Months 1–12	-0.043***	-0.017***
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Dependent Mean	0.12	0.05
Months 13-60	-0.081***	-0.034***
	(0.011)	(0.005)
Dependent Mean	0.13	0.05

Table 2: The Effects of Incarceration on Health Emergency.

*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. Emergency visits are health care visits to an ER. Mental Health emergency visits are health care visits to an ER for a mental health reason. The dependent mean is the mean of the outcome in the sample included in the regression. \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

**Heterogeneity.** Leveraging the richness of our data, we next explore heterogeneity in the effects of incarceration on mental health along three important dimensions: First, we consider inmates' past mental health history and investigate heterogeneity in the impacts across inmates who previously had no mental health disorder and those who had a disorder. Second, we consider heterogeneity by the prison conditions that inmates faced, distinguishing between inmates assigned to prisons with mild conditions, i.e., open prison or prisons with certified mental health or rehabilitation programs, or to prisons with harsh conditions, i.e., closed prisons without such certified prison programs. Finally, we consider heterogeneity by whether defendants faced a prison sentence for a violent or a non-violent crime.<sup>37</sup>

Columns (1)-(2) in Table 3 show the effects of incarceration by inmates' past mental health history, considering inmates who had no previous mental health disorders and those who had disorder prior to incarceration. If prison mainly reduces the probability of mental health disorders among the former group, then this could mean that prison safeguards against the onset of new mental health disorders among those without pre-existing mental health conditions. Alternatively, if

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>We also consider heterogeneity by prison spell length. We divide the sample of incarcerated defendants in 2009-2014 into two groups, below and above the median length at six months, and report the TWFE estimates in Figure A8 (Appendix A). We do not measure any significant difference in the effect of prison on mental health between offenders sentenced to short and long sentences, suggesting that in our context the extensive margin effect of prison matters more than time spent in prison.

prison only affects the latter group, then this may reflect that prison reduces the intensity of mental health disorders or rehabilitates some among the inmates with previous mental health disorders. Because we do not want to condition on the outcome in the TWFE estimation, we do not directly use information on the past mental health visits. Instead, we leverage very rich socio-demographic data to predict the probability of having any mental-health visit within the three years prior to the crime. We then define those with (no) previous disorder as defendants with predicted probability above (below) the sample median.<sup>38</sup> Focusing on the first 12 months post court decision, we find that both inmates with and without past mental health disorders are impacted similarly with regards to their probability of mental health visit (Panel A) and the number of mental health visits (Panel B). However, in the 13–60 month period after the court decision, the impacts, especially on the number of visits, are substantially larger for those with no previous disorders.

Next, we consider heterogeneity in the effects of incarceration by the prison conditions facing inmates.<sup>39</sup> Focusing on Panel A of Table 3, columns (3)-(4), we find that both inmates facing mild and harsh prison conditions have lower probabilities of mental health visits, with similar sized impacts, both in the first 12 months and in the 13–60 month period after the court decision. However, when we consider the number of mental health visits in Panel B, columns (3)-(4), we find much stronger reductions for inmates who faced mild prison conditions. Notably, these inmates experience larger reductions despite on average having a lower dependent mean. These findings suggest that the exposure to milder prison conditions seem to matter more at the intensive margin of mental health problems than at the extensive margin.

Finally, in Table 3, columns (5)-(6), we consider heterogeneity in the effects of incarceration by the type of crime that defendants faced a prison sentence for. Comparing defendants who committed a violent crime and those who committed a non-violent crime, we find little evidence for heterogeneity in the effects of incarceration on the probability of mental health visit (Panel A). However, we find that the point estimate on the number of mental health visits (Panel B) during the 13–60 month period post court decision is larger for inmates who committed a violent crime. The corresponding figures showing the time profile of the mental health effects of incarceration for these different subgroups can be found in Appendix A (Figures A5 to A7).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>The prediction model uses a flexible function of the following covariates: gender, age, foreign-born, marital status, number of children, education level, employment status, benefit recipient, wage, municipality, a variable indicating if a child died in the last 5 years and the age of death of the child. The prediction model is described more in Appendix B.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>For this analysis, only 85% of the sample of sentenced defendants is included since the information on prison identifiers is missing for the other inmates, which is required to classify the type of prison facility inmates served in.

Months 1–12 Dependent Mean Months 13–60	Past Mental Health History	rr 141. TT: - 4				
ean 0		Health History	Prison Conditions	onditions	Type (	Type of Crime
Months 1–12 Dependent Mean Months 13–60	No Disorder	Had Disorder	Mild	Harsh	Violent	Non-Violent
Months 1–12 Dependent Mean Months 13–60	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Dependent Mean Months 13–60	-0.037***	-0.033***	-0.036***	-0.034***	-0.033***	-0.036***
Dependent Mean Months 13–60	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Months 13–60	0.17	0.33	0.25	0.29	0.19	0.28
	-0.084***	-0.055***	-0.067***	-0.063***	-0.086***	-0.060***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Dependent Mean	0.18	0.33	0.25	0.29	0.18	0.28
Number of Observations	8,760	9,436	10,965	5,254	6,055	12,897
B. Number of Mental Healt	Health Visits					
	Past Mental I	Past Mental Health History	<b>Prison Conditions</b>	nditions	Type (	Type of Crime
I	No Disorder	Had Disorder	Mild	Harsh	Violent	Non-Violent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Months 1–12	-0.076***	-0.093***	-0.103***	-0.040***	-0.085***	-0.082***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Dependent Mean	0.38	0.84	0.59	0.72	0.42	0.69
Months 13–60	-0.169***	-0.111***	-0.153***	-0.055	-0.191***	-0.105***
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Dependent Mean	0.40	0.85	0.60	0.75	0.42	0.72
Number of Observations	8,760	9,436	10,965	5,254	6,055	12,897
Controls:						
Case x Individual FE	>	>	>	>	>	>
Period FE	>	>	>	>	>	>

Table 3: Heterogeneity by Past Mental Health History, Prison Conditions and Type of Crime.

*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and period (month × year) FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. Past mental health history is predicted using a sample of individuals in the Norwegian population register that are aged 10 years old or more in 2009 and alive in 2010. No (had) disorder is defined as below (above) the median of the predicted probability of having had a mental health visit in the 3 years preceding the crime. Prison conditions are defined for 85% of the sample of defendants sentenced to prison with non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014 that have non-missing prison ID. Mild conditions refer to open prisons or closed prison with a certified mental health or rehabilitation program, whereas harsh conditions refer to closed prisons without this type of programs. The dependent mean is the near of the outcome in the sample included in the regression. \*\*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*\*p<0.01.

**Relation to the literature.** Contrary to correlational studies often highlighting that inmates are at a higher risk of death or more likely to have health issues, our results point to a positive causal impact of prison on mental health. The two causal studies that are closest to ours, however, consistently find that incarceration decreases mortality risk. Using a modified DiD framework, Norris et al. (2020) find that incarcerated defendants face lower mortality rates than non-incarcerated defendants while in prison, and they can rule out a positive effect on mortality risk post-release. This protective effect of prison is stronger for deaths caused by homicides, overdoses or suicide. Focusing on the intensive margin of prison sentence, Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2020) exploit reforms in Sweden that provided a quasi-experimental variation in the time spent in prison. They show that more time spent in prison causes a decrease in mortality rates when zooming in on specific populations or causes of deaths. Interestingly, they find that the decrease in mortality risk is partly driven by a decrease in the chance of suicide of about 80% in the three years post release. This reduction is particularly strong for violent offenders, similarly to what we find, and offenders with history of mental health issue, whereas we find the opposite.

Although both studies use mortality as an outcome and cannot be quantitatively compared to ours, their conclusions of positive incarceration effects on defendant health coincide with our findings. In particular, the causes of deaths for which they find the strongest decrease are related to mental health (suicide and overdose), although they also find other margins of health improvement.

#### 4.3 Robustness

We now assess the robustness of our main findings on how prison affects inmates' mental health.

**Preceding and following events.** As discussed in Section 2.1, an incarceration event is always preceded by the event of crime and the trial process that follows criminal investigation. If the latter events also affect incarcerated defendants' mental health, then one can expect such effects to appear as pre-event changes in the mental health outcomes prior to court decision. While our graphical evidence in Figure 1b for mental health visits shows little indications of such pre-event effects, to encompass such impacts we now alternate the reference points used in the event study. Our baseline uses the first time-to-event dummy (i.e., 36th month before court decision) and the last time-to-event dummy before the event (i.e., one month before court decision) as reference points.

First, we re-estimate the event study specification by setting the second reference point to be the time-to-event dummy for 18 months before the court decision rather than one month before. More than three out of four defendants in our sample had committed the crime they are facing trial for during the 18 month period prior to court decision. To further distinguish the onset of court trial, we further add a vertical line at 4 months before the court decision, as three out of four defendants had the start of trial within the 4 months period prior to court decision. The event study

estimates on mental health visits using the alternative reference points at -36 and -18 months are provided in the Appendix Figure A9b. These estimates confirm our baseline estimates (repeated in Figure A9a) that prison significantly lowers inmates' likelihood of having mental health-related visits, with reductions persisting beyond the first 12 months after the court decision. If anything, incarcerated defendants have slightly higher rates of mental health-related visits in the 18 months prior to the court decision, which could be related to the onset of crime or the trial process.

Second, we re-estimate the event study specification dropping all periods between the month of crime and the month before the court decision, and instead using the month before the crime as the second reference point.<sup>40</sup> The results from this exercise are presented in the Appendix Figure A9c. Again, we find that the event of case decision is followed by a substantial reduction in the likelihood of mental health-related visits and these reductions persist over time.

Finally, since prison entry does not necessarily immediately follow the court decision,<sup>41</sup> we re-estimate the TWFE specification using prison entry as the event.<sup>42</sup> Results are reported in the Appendix Figure A9d. We observe a slight decrease in the probability of mental health visits before incarceration, followed by a sharp reduction right after. This immediate reduction likely captures an incapacitation effect of prison. Consistently, as inmates are gradually released, we do observe an increase up to half a year after prison entry. The longer term impacts remain strong and negative.

**Repeat offenders.** Another potential issue with the event study estimates relates to the presence of repeat offenders. If some defendants offend repeatedly and are re-incarcerated within the observed period, then their future self will be used as a control for their first offence. To the extent that the treatment effects of incarceration are not constant over time, or when the effects of repeated incarcerations are not additive, the presence of repeat offenders in our sample can make it harder to interpret the event study estimates. To address these concerns, we re-estimate the event study specification restricting the sample to the first observed offence within the 2009-2014 period. Imposing this restriction reduces the number of cases sentenced to prison over that period from 20,769 to 17,230. The results from this exercise are presented in the Appendix Figure A9e. Results remain virtually unchanged. The decrease in the probability of mental-health visits is even more pronounced and precisely estimated than in the baseline.

**Electronic monitoring.** On September 2008, Norway gradually introduced electronic monitoring as an alternative way of serving short prison sentences in some regions, until a national implemen-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>For this exercice, we consider only 12 months in the pre-event period, to keep a sample as balanced as possible.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>We report statistics on the time period between case decision and actual incarceration in Tables A6 and A7. The median is at 171 days and 138 days respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>We therefore exclude from this analysis the 12% of the sample who do not have a prison entry date reported (either because they emigrated, or served their sentence under electronic monitoring for instance).

tation on May 2014. It implies that some of the defendants included in our sample are not going to serve their sentence in prison, which would pollute our treatment definition.<sup>43</sup> We reproduce the main event-study graph excluding prison sentences served on electronic monitoring in Appendix A. Results remain virtually unchanged (Figure A9f).

Sensitivity of the IV estimates. In Table 1, column (3), we provided IV estimates of the effects of incarceration on defendants' mental health using a random judge design and the assigned judge's stringency as an instrument. While the IV estimates were more imprecise than the two-way fixed effects estimates, both approaches showed reductions in mental health outcomes. Following Bhuller et al. (2020), we also made attempts to assess the sensitivity of our IV estimates. While these baseline IV estimates were constructed for cases assigned to judges who had handled at least 50 cases (to ensure sufficient number of cases to precisely measure the judge stringency IV), we further also estimated the IV models for cases assigned to judges handling at least 75 or 100 cases, respectively. We also assessed the sensitivity of our IV estimates to calculating the judge stringency IV based on only non-confession cases, while in our baseline we had used all randomly assigned cases (both confession and non-confession cases) as in Bhuller et al. (2020). Furthermore, we also estimated a reverse sample IV, where we randomly splitted our sample in half and used one half of the sample to calculate the average incarceration rate of each judge and used these measures of judge stringency as an IV for incarceration in the other half of the sample. The results from these various sensitivity analyses are provided in the Appendix Table A9. While our results based on the IV approach do not qualitatively change, their magnitude and precision varies across specifications. For the number of mental health visits, coefficients vary from -0.4 to -0.7 and we loose precision in column (3), where the number of observations is also smaller. However, the point estimates still confirm our main findings that prison improves inmates' mental health.

## 5 Spillover Effects on Family Health and Wellbeing

We now consider the spillover effects of defendant incarceration on their pre-existing family members' mental health. These spillovers could both come from the more direct effect of removing the defendant from the family or as a spillover from the changes in defindants mental health as a consequence of prison. We start by estimating the effects of defendant incarceration on mental health outcomes of partners (including marital spouse or previously cohabitating partner), children and parents using the event study design.<sup>44</sup> The resulting estimates are illustrated in Figure 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>We count about 18% of the sample of offenders sentenced to prison in 2009-2014 that are serving under electronic monitoring either part or the full sentence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>Regarding children, we only include those who are aged 8 or more at the time of case decision. We end up with a sample of 24,378 children spells, 7,500 partner spells, and 67,357 parent spells with defendant's case decided between

Consistent with the large and persistent negative effects in Section 4 on the likelihood that defendants have mental health problems post incarceration, we also find similar impacts on defendants' partner's mental health visits in Figure 3a. Notably, the impact profile is relatively flat before the defendant's incarceration and declines sharply after the event. Focusing next on the defendants' children in Figure 3b, we again notice a tendency of negative point estimates post incarceration, however, the confidence intervals are too wide to draw firm conclusions. For the defendants' parents in Figure 3c, there is somewhat clearer evidence that at least in the longer-term incarcerated defendants' parents have lower likehood of mental health visits.




Figure 3: The Effects of Incarceration on Family Peers' Mental Health.

*Notes:* The sample of partners, children and parents of defendants sentenced to prison with non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

2009 and 2014. Since the TWFE is estimated on incarcerated defendants, accounting for about half of the sample, the number of observations reported in Table 4 is about half of the aforementionned number of family member spells.

Health Visit				
Partner or Spouse	Children	Parents		
(1)	(2)	(3)		
-0.027***	0.001	-0.002*		
(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)		
0.18	0.08	0.10		
-0.073***	-0.002	-0.007***		
(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.003)		
0.17	0.08	0.10		
B. Number of Mental Health Visits				
Partner or Spouse	Children	Parents		
(1)	(2)	(3)		
-0.065***	-0.003	-0.003		
(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.003)		
0.38	0.16	0.18		
-0.163***	-0.008	-0.016**		
(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.006)		
0.37	0.17	0.18		
3,595	12,370	29,939		
$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
/	/	/		
	Partner or Spouse (1) $-0.027^{***}$ (0.005) 0.18 $-0.073^{***}$ (0.010) 0.17 Outh Visits Partner or Spouse (1) $-0.065^{***}$ (0.015) 0.38 $-0.163^{***}$ (0.030) 0.37	Partner or SpouseChildren $(1)$ $(2)$ $-0.027^{***}$ $0.001$ $(0.005)$ $(0.002)$ $0.18$ $0.08$ $-0.073^{***}$ $-0.002$ $(0.010)$ $(0.004)$ $0.17$ $0.08$ Ilth VisitsPartner or SpouseChildren $(1)$ $(2)$ $-0.065^{***}$ $-0.003$ $(0.015)$ $(0.38)$ $0.16$ $-0.163^{***}$ $-0.008$ $(0.030)$ $(0.011)$ $0.37$ $0.17$		

Table 4: The Effects of Incarceration on Family Peers' Mental Health.

Notes: The sample of family members of defendants with non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014. Column (1) reports the TWFE estimates on the sample of partners, and includes controls for case and period (month × year) FEs. Column (2) reports the TWFE estimates on the sample of children aged 8 years or more at the time of case decision, and includes controls for case × child ID and period (month × year) FEs. Column (3) reports the TWFE estimates on the sample of parents, and includes controls for case × parent ID and period (month × year) FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The dependent mean is the mean of the outcome in the sample included in the regression. \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table 4 reports the corresponding estimates from the two-way fixed effects specification, which summarizes the event study estimates for the 1–12 months and for the 13–60 months post court decision. Column (1) confirms the event study results, indicating that incarcerated defendants' partners have lower likelihoods of mental health visit (Panel A) and fewer mental health visits (Panel B), and the improvements in their mental health persist after the 12 month period post court decision, when the defendant is also likely to be out of prison. Unlike defendants, their family members by construction do not experience incapacitation and thus the reductions in their mental health visits are likely to reflect fewer mental health problems already from the initial period when the defendants faced court decision. The similarity across the impact profiles for defendants and their partners, however, could reflect that both experience gradual improvements in their mental health. Focusing on the defendants' parents in Column (3), we again find noticeable declines in mental health visits, especially in the post 12 month period when defendants are likely out of prison. To further investigate the channels driving the positive effect on spouses' mental health, we look at the probability for the incarcerated defendant of staying with the same spouse as the one defined the




Figure 4: The Effects of Incarceration on the Incidence of Child Protection Service Events.

Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

year before case decision.<sup>45</sup> Five years after case decision, only about 40% of the spouses are still together, suggesting that the "removal of a bad influence" channel could be at play.<sup>46</sup> Comparing single inmates and those with a partner, we also find that inmates with a partner the year before case decision exhibit stronger declines in the probability of mental health related visits (Figure A11). This is in line with the hypothesis that the marked improvement in the offender's mental health spills over to the mental health of family members.

To further assess the impacts on family wellbeing and child outcomes, we utilize additional data on yearly child protection services (CPS) incident reports. Specifically, these data enable us to measure two types of CPS-related events at the annual level for families with incarcerated defendants. First, we observe all events of foster care provided to child at high risk of neglect or abuse. We consider whether at least one child in the defendant's family was taken out of the family residence by the CPS and provided an alternative home shelter elsewhere. Second, we also observe events of in-home assistance provided by CPS caseworkers to families that experience social problems and where child face some risk of neglect or abuse. As earlier, we exploit the timing of defendants' incarceration in an event study design to study how the prevalence of foster care and in-home CPS assistance change following the incarceration event. The results are illustrated in Figure 4. Consistent with our previous evidence on improvements in family mental health, we find significant reductions in the likelihood of in-home assistance post event in Figure 4b. Similarly,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup>Our sample of spouses are defined as the spouses of defendants the year before case decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>Supporting this hypothesis, we plot in Figures A10 of Appendix A the TWFE estimates on spouses separately for those who are still with the defendant five years after case decision and those who are not. The Figures show that the negative effects on the probability and number of a mental health visits are concentrated among spouses who did not stay with the defendant. While we cannot interpret this result causally, given the endogeneity of the decision of staying with the defendant, this may suggest that removing a dysfunctional spouse could partly explain the positive impact of incarceration on the mental health of the spouse.

we also notice a decline in the likelihood of foster care, although the effect estimates are only significant at year 5 post incarceration.

Taken together, the evidence that incarcerated defendants' family members experience fewer mental health problems and that there are much fewer child protection-related incidents in these families suggests that incarceration can have important positive spillovers on family health and wellbeing. These findings also support our main evidence that incarcerated defendants themselves also experience improvements in their own mental health for a prolonged period after prison.

# 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we looked at the impact of incarceration on the health of defendants in general, and their mental health in particular. We went beyond the positive association between incarceration and the prevalance of mental health disorders by relying on two different methodologies. The two-way fixed-effects approach exploited the variation in the date of incarceration decision while controlling for time and case fixed-effects. To support this methodology, we used an alternative approach where we instrumented the incarceration of defendants using the assigned judge's stringency, taking advantage of random assignment of cases to judges. Both methods consistently showed that prison causally lowered the prevalence of mental health disorders. Our findings demonstrate that the reduction lasts post release, and that it is driven by a decrease both in addiction related and mood disorder related visits.

We further contribute by measuring the first causal estimates on the impact of prison on the health of the family members of the defendants: incarceration has positive spillovers on the mental health of spouses, parents and children. The decrease in child protection related incidents for children of incarcerated defendants further supports the idea that the wellbeing of the family is positively impacted. Overall, our findings suggest that time spent in prison with a focus on rehabilitation can have large positive effects that go beyond the direct effects on the defendant.

# References

- Aebi, M., M. Tiago, and C. Burkhardt (2015). Survey on prison populations (space i-prison populations survey 2014) survey 2014.
- Aizer, A. and J. J. Doyle Jr (2015). Juvenile incarceration, human capital, and future crime: Evidence from randomly assigned judges. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130(2), 759–803.
- Anderson, D. M., R. Cesur, and E. Tekin (2015). Youth depression and future criminal behavior. *Economic Inquiry* 53(1), 294–317.
- Angrist, J. and G. Imbens (1994). Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects. *Econometrica* 62(2), 467–475.
- Baicker, K., S. L. Taubman, H. L. Allen, M. Bernstein, J. H. Gruber, J. P. Newhouse, E. C. Schneider, B. J. Wright, A. M. Zaslavsky, and A. N. Finkelstein (2013). The Oregon Experiment– Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes. *New England Journal of Medicine 368*(18), 1713– 1722.
- Bhuller, M., G. B. Dahl, and K. V. Løken (2018). Policies to reintegrate former inmates into the labor force. *Policy Memo*.
- Bhuller, M., G. B. Dahl, K. V. Løken, and M. Mogstad (2020). Incarceration, recidivism, and employment. *Journal of Political Economy* 128(4), 1269–1324.
- Biasi, B., M. S. Dahl, and P. Moser (2021). Career effects of mental health. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Binswanger, I. A., M. F. Stern, R. A. Deyo, P. J. Heagerty, A. Cheadle, J. G. Elmore, and T. D. Koepsell (2007). Release from prison-a high risk of death for former inmates. *New England Journal of Medicine 356*(2), 157–165.
- Bohn, A. (2000). Domsstolloven, kommentarutgave [law of courts, annotated edition]. *Universitetsopplaget, Oslo (in Norwegian).*
- Bondurant, S. R., J. M. Lindo, and I. D. Swensen (2018). Substance abuse treatment centers and local crime. *Journal of Urban Economics* 104, 124–133.
- Borusyak, K. (2021). Did\_imputation: Stata module to perform treatment effect estimation and pre-trend testing in event studies.
- Borusyak, K. and X. Jaravel (2017). Revisiting event study designs. Available at SSRN 2826228.

- Borusyak, K., X. Jaravel, and J. Spiess (2021). Revisiting event study designs: Robust and efficient estimation. *Unpublished working paper, version May 19*, 2021.
- Bronson, J. and M. Berzofsky (2017). Indicators of mental health problems reported by prisoners and jail inmates, 2011–12. *Bureau of Justice Statistics*, 1–16.
- Bütikofer, A., C. J. Cronin, and M. M. Skira (2020). Employment effects of healthcare policy: Evidence from the 2007 fda black box warning on antidepressants. *Journal of Health Economics* 73, 102348.
- Carson, E. (2015). Bureau of justice statistics (bjs)-prisoners in 2014. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)-Prisoners in 2014.
- Council of Economic Advisers (2016). Economic perspectives on incarceration and the criminal justice system.
- Cramer, V. (2014). The prevalence of mental disorders among convicted inmates in norwegian prisons. *Southeastern Regional Health Authority: Oslo, Norway.*
- Currie, J. and M. Stabile (2006). Child mental health and human capital accumulation: the case of adhd. *Journal of health economics* 25(6), 1094–1118.
- Davis, L. M., J. L. Steele, R. Bozick, M. V. Williams, S. Turner, J. N. Miles, J. Saunders, and P. S. Steinberg (2014). *How effective is correctional education, and where do we go from here? The results of a comprehensive evaluation*. Rand Corporation.
- Deza, M., J. C. Maclean, and K. T. Solomon (2020). Local access to mental healthcare and crime. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Dobbie, W., J. Goldin, and C. S. Yang (2018). The effects of pretrial detention on conviction, future crime, and employment: Evidence from randomly assigned judges. *American Economic Review 108*(2), 201–40.
- Fletcher, J. and B. Wolfe (2009). Long-term consequences of childhood adhd on criminal activities. *The journal of mental health policy and economics* 12(3), 119.
- Friestad, C. and E. Kjelsberg (2009). Drug use and mental health problems among prison inmatesresults from a nation-wide prison population study. *Nordic Journal of Psychiatry* 63(3), 237–245.
- GAO, G. A. O. (2012). Growing inmate crowding negatively affects inmates, staff, and infrastructure.

- Goodman, A., R. Joyce, and J. P. Smith (2011). The long shadow cast by childhood physical and mental problems on adult life. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108*(15), 6032–6037.
- Gottfredson, D. M. (1999). *Effects of judges' sentencing decisions on criminal careers*. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
- Green, D. P. and D. Winik (2010). Using random judge assignments to estimate the effects of incarceration and probation on recidivism among drug offenders. *Criminology* 48(2), 357–387.
- Haglund, A., D. Tidemalm, J. Jokinen, N. Långström, P. Lichtenstein, S. Fazel, and B. Runeson (2014). Suicide after release from prison: a population-based cohort study from sweden. *The Journal of clinical psychiatry* 75(10), 0–0.
- Haney, C. (2017). "Madness" and penal confinement: Some observations on mental illness and prison pain. *Punishment & Society 19*(3), 310–326.
- Henrichson, C. and R. Ruth Delaney (2012). Price of prisons: What incarceration costs taxpayers. *Center on Sentencing and Corrections, Vera Institute of Justice.*
- Hjalmarsson, R. and M. J. Lindquist (2020). The health effects of prison.
- Jácome, E. (2020). Mental health and criminal involvement: Evidence from losing medicaid eligibility.
- Kjelsberg, E., P. Hartvig, H. Bowitz, I. Kuisma, P. Norbech, A.-B. Rustad, M. Seem, and T.-G. Vik (2006). Mental health consultations in a prison population: a descriptive study. *BMC psychiatry* 6(1), 1–9.
- Kling, J. R. et al. (1999). The effect of prison sentence length on the subsequent employment and earnings of criminal defendants. Technical report.
- Kristoffersen, R. (2014). Correctional statistics of denmark, finland, iceland, norway and sweden 2009-2013.
- Loeffler, C. E. (2013). Does imprisonment alter the life course? evidence on crime and employment from a natural experiment. *Criminology* 51(1), 137–166.
- Lundborg, P., A. Nilsson, and D.-O. Rooth (2014). Adolescent health and adult labor market outcomes. *Journal of Health Economics* 37, 25–40.
- Moe, B. (2018). Country Report Norway: Prison Health in Norway The "Import Model".

- Mueller-Smith, M. (2015). The criminal and labor market impacts of incarceration. *Unpublished Working Paper 18.*
- Norris, S., M. Pecenco, and J. Weaver (2020). The effect of incarceration on mortality. *Available at SSRN 3644719*.
- Norris, S., M. Pecenco, and J. Weaver (2021). The effects of parental and sibling incarceration: Evidence from ohio. *American Economic Review 111*(9), 2926–63.
- Norwegian Institute of Public Health (2018). Health status in norway.
- NOU (2002). Dømmes av likemenn [judged by peers]. *Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Norway (In Norwegian).*
- Raphael, S. and M. A. Stoll (2013). *Why are so many Americans in prison?* Russell Sage Foundation.
- Rose, E. K. and Y. Shem-Tov (2021). How does incarceration affect reoffending? estimating the dose-response function.
- Sailas, E. S., B. Feodoroff, N. C. Lindberg, M. E. Virkkunen, R. Sund, and K. Wahlbeck (2006). The mortality of young offenders sentenced to prison and its association with psychiatric disorders: a register study. *The European Journal of Public Health 16*(2), 193–197.
- Turney, K., C. Wildeman, and J. Schnittker (2012). As fathers and felons: Explaining the effects of current and recent incarceration on major depression. *Journal of health and social behavior* 53(4), 465–481.
- Tuttle, C. (2019). Snapping back: Food stamp bans and criminal recidivism. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11*(2), 301–27.
- Weidner, R. R. and J. Schultz (2019). Examining the relationship between us incarceration rates and population health at the county level. *SSM-population health* 9, 100466.
- Western, B. (2021). Inside the box: Safety, health, and isolation in prison. *Journal of Economic Persoectives* 35(4), 97–122.
- Western, B., J. R. Kling, and D. F. Weiman (2001). The labor market consequences of incarceration. *Crime & delinquency 47*(3), 410–427.
- WHO (2021). Depression: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/depression.

# **A** Online Appendix – Additional Figures and Tables





Figure A1: Timeline from Crime to Prison Release.

Notes: This figure reports the median (top figure in red) and average (bottom figure in blue) time between each step of the timeline for the sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014.


Figure A2: Cumulative Distribution and Density of Prison Spell Length.




Density ---- Cumulative distribution function


Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2005-2014. The graph plots the density and cumulative distribution function of prison sentence length.

Figure A3: Correlation between Predicted Health Care Visits and Judge Stringency.




Notes: Sample of all non-confession criminal cases decided 2006-2014. The number of health care visits has been predicted using the same setof socio-demographics and past and current crime variables as the one included in Table A11.






*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

Figure A5: Heterogeneity: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits by Mental Health History.



*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

Figure A6: Heterogeneity: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits by Type of Crime.




*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

Figure A8: Heterogeneity: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits by Sentence Length.



*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.

Figure A7: Heterogeneity: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits by Prison Conditions.



*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies.





Figure A9: Robustness: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits.

#### (a) Baseline

(b) Alternative Reference Points


Notes: Figures (a), (b) and (c) are based on the sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. Figure (d) is based on the sample of first occurrences of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graphs plot the coefficients from the distance dummies.

Figure A10: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits by Spouse Status Five Years after Decision




(a) Probability of Mental Health Visits

(b) Number of Mental Health Visits




Notes: The sample of spouses as defined in the year before case decision for non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies separately for spouses who are not together with the defendant five years after the case decisions (LHS) and for spouses who are still with the defendant five years after case decision (RHS).

Figure A11: The Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits by Spouse Status One Year before Decision.



(a) Probability of Mental Health Visits

(b) Number of Mental Health Visits



Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases sentenced to prison and processed 2009-2014. The estimation includes controls for case and month × year FEs. Standard errors are clustered at case level. 95% confidence intervals. The graph plots the coefficients from the distance dummies separately for single inmates (LHS) and inmates with a spouse (RHS) the year before decision.

	Number	Frequency	Cumulative
			fre-
			quency
Drug abuse	46212	22.25	22.25
Depressive disorder	15429	7.43	29.67
Anxiety disorder	10667	5.13	34.81
Hyperkinetic disorder	8496	4.09	38.9
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use	13428	6.46	45.36
of opioids : dependence syndrome			
Medication abuse	5992	2.88	48.25
Chronic alcohol abuse	5846	2.81	51.06
Acute stress reaction	5577	2.68	53.74
Sleep disturbance	5568	2.68	56.42
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use	4165	2	58.43
of opioids : unspecified mental and			
behavioural disorder			
Feeling anxious/nervous/tense	4056	1.95	60.38
Psychological disorders, other	4038	1.94	62.33
Psychological symptom/complt other	3849	1.85	64.18
Disturbance of activity and attention	3472	1.67	65.85
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use	3157	1.52	67.37
of alcohol : dependence syndrome			
Affective psychosis	2823	1.36	68.73
Mental and behavioural disorders due to	2790	1.34	70.07
multiple drug use and use of other			
psychoactive substances : harmful use			
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use	2384	1.15	71.22
of cannabinoids : dependence syndrome			
Schizophrenia	2237	1.08	72.3
Number of Observations		207,739	

### Table A1: Most Common Mental-Health Diagnoses.

*Notes:* This table reports the most common diagnoses defined as mental health related for the year 2010 in the sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2005-2014 with at least one mental health diagnosis in year 2010.

	Number	Frequency	Cumulative fre-
Drug abuse	46212	45.37	quency 45.37
Mental and behavioural disorders due	13428	13.18	58.55
to use of opioids : dependence syndrome	10120	10110	00000
Medication abuse	5992	5.88	64.43
Chronic alcohol abuse	5846	5.74	70.17
Mental and behavioural disorders due to multiple drug use and use of other psychoactive substances : dependence syndrome	4786	4.7	74.87
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol : dependence syndrome	3157	3.1	77.97
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of cannabinoids : dependence syndrome	3019	2.96	80.93
Mental and behavioural disorders due to multiple drug use and use of other psychoactive substances : harmful use	2790	2.74	83.67
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol : harmful use	2007	1.97	85.64
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of other stimulants, including caffeine : dependence syndrome	1716	1.68	87.32
Acute alcohol abuse	1071	1.05	88.37
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of cannabinoids : harmful use	874	0.86	89.23
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of other stimulants, including caffeine : harmful use	628	0.62	89.85
Mental and behavioural disorders due to multiple drug use and use of other psychoactive substances : unspecified mental and behavioural disorder	589	0.58	90.43
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol : dependence syndrome	567	0.56	90.98
Number of Observations		101,867	

### Table A2: Most Common Addiction Diagnoses.

Notes: This table reports the most common diagnoses defined as addiction related for the year 2010 in the sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2005-2014 with at least one addiction diagnosis in year 2010.

	Number	Frequency	Cumulative frequency
Depressive disorder	15429	14.57	14.57
Anxiety disorder/anxiety state	10667	10.08	24.65
Hyperkinetic disorder	8496	8.02	32.67
Acute stress reaction	5577	5.27	37.94
Sleep disturbance	5568	5.26	43.2
Feeling anxious/nervous/tense	4056	3.83	47.03
Psychological disorders, other	4038	3.81	50.85
Psychological symptom/complt other	3849	3.64	54.48
Disturbance of activity and attention	3472	3.28	57.76
Affective psychosis	2823	2.67	60.43
Schizophrenia	2237	2.11	62.54
Feeling depressed	2121	2	64.54
Personality disorder	2022	1.91	66.45
Mental disorder, not otherwise specified	1921	1.81	68.27
Phobia/compulsive disorder	1869	1.77	70.03
Number of Observations		105	5,872

Table A3: Most Common Depression or Mood-Disorder Related Diagnoses.

Notes: This table reports the most common diagnoses defined as depression or mood-disorder related for the year 2010 in the sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2005-2014 with at least one depression or mood-disorder diagnosis in year 2010.

	Number	Frequency	Cumulative fre- quency
General disease NOS	27392	9.36	9.36
General psychiatric	16255	5.55	14.91
examination, not elsewhere classified			
No disease	11223	3.83	18.75
Back symptom/complaint	7349	2.51	21.26
Limited function/disability NOS	6661	2.28	23.54
Low back symptom/complaint	5461	1.87	25.4
Back syndrome w/o radiating pain	5302	1.81	27.21
Back syndrome with radiating pain	5060	1.73	28.94
Neck symptom/complain	4037	1.38	30.32
Observation for suspected mental and behavioural	3566	1.22	31.54
disorders			
Shoulder	3422	1.17	32.71
symptom/complaint			
General symptom/complaint other	3213	1.1	33.81
Shoulder syndrome	3164	1.08	34.89
Upper respiratory infection acute	3142	1.07	35.96
Knee symptom/complaint	3074	1.05	37.01
Abdominal pain/cramps general	2715	0.93	37.94
Muscle pain	2557	0.87	38.81
Neck syndrome	2470	0.84	39.66
Injury musculoskeletal NOS	2409	0.82	40.48
Hypertension uncomplicated	2354	0.8	41.29
Asthma	2349	0.8	42.09
Number of Observations		292,659	

Table A4: Most Common Physical-Health Diagnoses.

Notes: This table reports the most common diagnoses defined as physical health related for the year 2010 in the sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2005-2014 with at least one physical health diagnosis in year 2010.

	General Population	Sample	(2) - (1)	(2) - (1) With Controls	(2) - (1) Standard- ized With Controls
Health Care Visits	8.656	14.829	6.173*** (0.071)	9.622*** (0.068)	0.724*** (0.005)
Physical Health Diagnoses	6.817	7.754	0.937***	3.852***	0.343***
Mental Health Diagnoses	0.926	5.687	(0.06) 4.761*** (0.024)	(0.057) 4.911*** (0.024)	(0.005) 1.088*** (0.005)
Number of Observations	4779380	36017	4815397	4814890	4814890

## Table A5: General Population vs. Sample of Defendants in 2010.

Notes: This table reports summary statistics in the year 2010 for the general population and the sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2005-2014 with at least on health care visit in 2010.

	mean	sd	p10	p50	p90
Age at the time of case decision	33.274	11.666	19.967	31.23	49.515
Female	0.112	0.315			
Foreignborn	0.142	0.349			
Married in year t-1	0.106	0.307			
Number of children in year t-1	0.792	1.25	0	0	3
High school by year t-1	0.173	0.378			
Some college education in year	0.049	0.216			
t-1					
Violent crime	0.274	0.446			
Property crime	0.128	0.334			
Economic crime	0.106	0.308			
Drug-related crime	0.133	0.34			
Drunk driving	0.075	0.263			
Traffic violation (speeding, no	0.07	0.254			
license)					
Missing data on sex, age,	0.032	0.175			
foreign-born status or education					
Court decision outcome: prison is	0.53	0.499			
the strictest sentence					
Number of days between crime	595.28	857.494	124	322	1303
and case decision date					
Number of days between case	279.17	332	0	171	710
decision and prison entry date	,		÷		
Days of prison sentence if given	337.897	456.981	24	150	1080
prison					
Employed in year t-1	0.345	0.475			
Ever employed in years t-2 to t-5	0.463	0.499			
Ever Charged in year t-1	0.467	0.499			
Ever Charged in years t-2 to t-5	0.642	0.479			
Ever incarcerated in year t-1	0.137	0.344			
Ever incarcerated in years t-2 to	0.288	0.453			
t-5	0.200	01100			
Ever health care visit in months	0.902	0.297			
t-1 to t-12	0.002	0,			
Number of health care visits in	15.705	21.455	1	8	39
months t-1 to t-12	101100	211100	1	0	57
Ever physical health diagnosis in	0.843	0.364			
months t-1 to t-12	0.010	0.501			
Number of physical health	7.348	12.075	0	4	18
diagnoses in months t-1 to t-12	7.540	12.075	0	т	10
Ever mental-health related	0.535	0.499			
diagnosis in months t-1 to t-12	0.335	0.477			
Number of mental-health related	6.852	13.874	0	1	21
diagnoses in months t-1 to t-12	0.032	13.0/4	U	1	<i>L</i> 1
	-48				

Table A6: Summary Statistics on the Sample of Defendants

Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2006-2014 with non-missing demographics, type of crime, past work, crime and health history variables.

			Pe	ercent	ile	Mean
	Mean	Standard Devia-	10	50	90	Difference: Non- incarcerated
		tion				- incarcer- ated
						defendants
Ever health care visit in month t	0.43	0.495				-0.010***
						(0.002)
Number of health care visits in month t	1.229	2.272	0	0	4	-0.057***
	0.000	0.450				(0.010)
Ever visit for physical-health visit in month t	0.286	0.452				0.007***
	0.500	1 201	0	0	2	(0.002)
Number of visits for physical-health visit in month t	0.582	1.391	0	0	2	0.012*
	0.000	0.406				(0.006)
Ever visit for mental-health visit in month t	0.208	0.406				-0.020***
Normalistic Contractor Contractor	0.500	1 425	0	0	2	(0.002)
Number of visits for mental-health visit in month t	0.508	1.435	0	0	2	-0.050***
Free state for a state of a state of a state of a	0.001	0.007				(0.006) -0.023***
Ever visit for substance abuse in month t	0.091	0.287				
Number of visits for substance abuse in month t	0.225	1.00	0	0	0	(0.001)
Number of visits for substance abuse in month t	0.235	1.09	0	0	0	-0.054***
Even visit for days abuse in month t	0.075	0.264				(0.005) -0.020***
Ever visit for drug abuse in month t	0.075	0.204				
Number of visits for drug abuse in month t	0.2	1.026	0	0	0	(0.001) -0.049***
Number of visits for drug abuse in month t	0.2	1.020	0	0	0	(0.004)
Ever visit for alcohol abuse in month t	0.013	0.115				-0.003***
Ever visit for alconor abuse in month t	0.015	0.115				
Number of visits for alcohol abuse in month t	0.026	0.302	0	0	0	(0.000) -0.002
Number of visits for alcohor abuse in month t	0.020	0.302	0	0	0	(0.001)
Ever visit for opioid abuse in month t	0.017	0.13				-0.004***
Ever visit for optoid abuse in month t	0.017	0.15				(0.001)
Number of visits for opioid abuse in month t	0.036	0.356	0	0	0	-0.007***
Number of visits for optoid abuse in monul t	0.050	0.550	0	0	0	(0.001)
Ever visit for severe mood disorder in month t	0.036	0.186				0.001
	0.050	0.100				(0.001)
Number of visits for severe mood disorder in month t	0.067	0.462	0	0	0	-0.002
	0.007	0.102	0	0	Ū	(0.002)
Ever visit for light mood disorder in month t	0.051	0.22				0.001
	0.001					(0.001)
Number of visits for light mood disorder in month t	0.09	0.488	0	0	0	0.007***
	5.07	5.100	Ŭ	0	Ŭ	(0.002)
						(3.00-)

Table A8: Health Variable Distribution in the Sample of Defendants.

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2006-2014 measured in the months 36 to 30 before case decision.

	mean	sd	p10	p50	p90
Age at the time of case decision	34.091	11.193	21.101	32.107	49.6
Female	0.076	0.265			
Foreignborn	0.151	0.358			
Married in year t-1	0.095	0.293			
Number of children in year t-1	0.796	1.262	0	0	3
High school by year t-1	0.168	0.374			
Some college education in year	0.043	0.203			
t-1					
Violent crime	0.315	0.465			
Property crime	0.126	0.331			
Economic crime	0.078	0.269			
Drug-related crime	0.131	0.338			
Drunk driving	0.083	0.276			
Traffic violation (speeding, no	0.051	0.219			
license)					
Missing data on sex, age,	0.038	0.191			
foreign-born status or education					
Number of days between crime	652.701	1019.427	120	316	154
and case decision date					
Number of days between case	183.014	208.583	0	138	405
decision and prison entry date					
Days of prison sentence if given	359.636	463.737	25	180	108
prison					
Employed in year t-1	0.331	0.47			
Ever employed in years t-2 to t-5	0.457	0.498			
Ever Charged in year t-1	0.529	0.499			
Ever Charged in years t-2 to t-5	0.707	0.455			
Ever incarcerated in year t-1	0.187	0.39			
Ever incarcerated in years t-2 to	0.383	0.486			
t-5					
Ever health care visit in months t-1 to t-12	0.909	0.288	1	1	1
Number of health care visits in	16.521	22.745	1	9	41
months t-1 to t-12	10.321	22.143	1	)	+1
Ever physical health diagnosis in	0.847	0.36	0	1	1
months t-1 to t-12	0.047	0.50	0	1	1
Number of physical health	7.496	12.92	0	4	18
diagnoses in months t-1 to t-12	/.+70	12.72	0	4	10
Ever mental-health related	0.564	0.496	0	1	1
diagnosis in months t-1 to t-12	0.304	0.490	U	1	1
Number of mental-health related	7 207	14 762	0	1	าา
	7.387	14.763	0	1	22
diagnoses in months t-1 to t-12 Observations		1	8 210		
JUSCIVATIONS		1	8,219		

Table A7: Summary Statistics on the Sample of Incarcerated Defendants

Notes: The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014 with non-missing demographics, type of crime, past work, crime and health history variables that were sentenced to prison.

	<b>Baseline IV</b>	Number of Cas	Number of Cases Handled by Judge	Definition of Judge Stringency IV	ge Stringency IV
Definition of Judge Stringency IV:	Random	Random	Random	Non-Confession	<b>Reverse Sample</b>
No. of Cases Handled By Judge:	$\geq 50$ cases	$\geq$ 75 cases	$\geq 100 \text{ cases}$	$\geq 50$ cases	$\geq 50$ cases
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
A. First-Stage Estimates					
Incarcerated	0.355***	$0.367^{***}$	$0.376^{***}$	$0.275^{***}$	$0.380^{***}$
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Dependent Mean	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.52	0.53
B. IV Estimates: Probability of Mental	ntal Health Visit				
Months 1–60	-0.115	-0.085	-0.047	-0.080	-0.120*
	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.062)
Dependent Mean	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25
C. IV Estimates: Number of Mental Health Visits	Health Visits				
Months 1–60	-0.726***	-0.577*	-0.379	-0.580*	-0.625**
	(0.341)	(0.327)	(0.304)	(0.324)	(0.259)
Dependent Mean	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65
Number of Observations	35,082	34,202	32,746	35,082	35,082
Controls:					
Demographics	>	>	>	>	>
Type of Crime	>	>	>	>	>
Past Work & Crime History	>	>	>	>	>
Court × Year FE	>	>	>	>	>

Table A9: Robustness: IV Estimates of the Effects of Incarceration on Mental Health Visits.

*Notes:* Sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2009-2014. All estimations include court ×case entry year FEs and demographics (age, sex, foreign-born status, number of children, marital status, level of education). type of crime, past work and crime history (indicator for being employed in year t-1 to t-5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcenated in year t-1 to to 5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcenated in year t-1 to to 5 before the year of crime, indicator for being ever incarcenated in year t-1 to to 5 before the year of crase decision) controls. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the judge and defendant level in the IV estimation. 95% confidence intervals. The first column reproduces the baseline IV estimation presented in Table 1. Columns (2) and (3) vary the definition of the sample and exclude, respectively, judges who handled less than 75 and 100 randomly assigned confession ron-confession cases between the years 2005 and 2014. Column (4) excludes confession cases for the computation of the judge stringency score. \*p-G0.1, \*\*p-G0.05, \*\*\*p-G0.01.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Estimation sample:	Time of	Month	Month	Month	Month	Month
	decision	12 after	24 after	36 after	48 after	60 after
		decision	decision	decision	decision	decision
Dependent variable:			Pr(Incar	cerated)		
A. Court $\times$ Year of Co	ourt Case Reg	gistration In	teracted Fixe	ed Effects		
Judge Stringency	0.3812***	0.3786***	0.3760***	0.3711***	0.3689***	0.3662***
	(0.0546)	(0.0550)	(0.0552)	(0.0554)	(0.0552)	(0.0558)
F-stat (Instrument)	48.65	47.35	46.39	44.82	44.58	43.04
B. Add Controls for I	Demographic	s and Type o	of Crime			
Judge Stringency	0.3683***	0.3649***	0.3623***	0.3591***	0.3577***	0.3566***
	(0.0536)	(0.0540)	(0.0542)	(0.0545)	(0.0542)	(0.0547)
F-stat (Instrument)	47.17	45.74	44.64	43.39	43.63	42.53
C. Add Controls for I	Demographic	s, Type of C	Crime, Past V	Vork and Cri	iminal Histo	ry
Judge Stringency	0.3606***	0.3583***	0.3589***	0.3569***	0.3569***	0.3548***
	(0.0493)	(0.0497)	(0.0499)	(0.0502)	(0.0502)	(0.0508)
F-stat (Instrument)	53.45	51.88	51.64	50.65	50.46	48.82
Dependent mean	0.5301	0.5292	0.5278	0.5261	0.5251	0.5239
Number of cases	59556	59059	58118	57193	56341	55459

Table A10: First-Stage Estimates: The Effect of Judge Stringency on Incarceration Probability.

*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2006-2014. The estimation includes controls for case  $\times$  case decision year FEs. Reported F-statistic refers to a joint test of the null hypothesis for all variables. The omitted category for education is "Less than high school, year t-1" and the omitted category for type of crime is "Other crimes". Standard errors are two-way clustered at judge and defendant level. \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

	Incarce	rated	Judge Stri	ingency
	(1)	)	(2)	)
Age at the time of case decision	0.0035***	(0.0003)	0.0000	(0.0000)
Female	-0.0589***	(0.0054)	-0.0014***	(0.0005)
Foreign-born	0.0054	(0.0044)	0.0003	(0.0004)
Married, year t-1	-0.0204**	(0.0089)	-0.0012	(0.0009)
Number of children, year t-1	-0.0016	(0.0023)	0.0004	(0.0002
High school degree, year t-1	-0.0013	(0.0062)	0.0013**	(0.0007
Some college, year t-1	-0.0440***	(0.0093)	-0.0007	(0.0012
Violent crime	0.0945***	(0.0066)	-0.0005	(0.0008
Property crime	-0.0431***	(0.0088)	-0.0003	(0.0009
Economic crime	-0.0683***	(0.0091)	0.0007	(0.0010
Drug-related crime	-0.0649***	(0.0079)	-0.0012	(0.0010
Drunk driving	0.0713***	(0.0095)	-0.0011	(0.0009
Other Traffic	-0.0574***	(0.0107)	-0.0012	(0.0011
Missing X s	-0.2961***	(0.0995)	0.0053	(0.0114
Employed, year t-1	0.0180***	(0.0062)	-0.0006	(0.0007
Ever employed, years t-2 to t-5	0.0163***	(0.0062)	-0.0011*	(0.0006
Ever Charged, year t-1	0.0529***	(0.0053)	-0.0004	(0.0006
Ever Charged, years t-2 to t-5	0.0589***	(0.0061)	0.0001	(0.0007
Ever incarcerated, year t-1	0.1472***	(0.0078)	-0.0001	(0.0009
Ever incarcerated, years t-2 to t-5	0.1658***	(0.0069)	0.0009	(0.0007
Number of health care visits, month t-1	-0.0074**	(0.0033)	0.0001	(0.0004
Number of mental-health diagnoses, month t-1	0.0057*	(0.0034)	-0.0002	(0.0004
Number of physical-health diagnoses, month t-1	0.0043	(0.0036)	0.0001	(0.0004
Missing health information	0.0947***	(0.0343)	0.0002	(0.0041
Constant	0.2591***	(0.0113)	0.4619***	(0.0027
F-statistic for joint test	152.9	980	1.27	'4
p-value	(0.00	)0)	(0.17	'3)
Dependent variable mean	0.53	01	0.46	17
Dependent variable sd	0.49	91	0.072	25
Number of cases	59,5	56	59,5	56

Table A11: Tests of Randomization.

*Notes:* The sample of non-confession criminal cases processed 2006-2014. All estimations include controls for court  $\times$  case decision year FEs. Reported F-statistic refers to a joint test of the null hypothesis for all variables. The omitted category for education is "Less than high school, year t-1" and the omitted category for type of crime is "Other crimes". Standard errors are two-way clustered at judge and defendant level. \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01.

## **B** Online Appendix – Details on the Prediction Model

Mental health score is computed by predicting the probability to have at least one mental-health related visit in the years three to one before the crime. The prediction model is trained on the general population (excluding our sample) in the population register in 2009-2010. We then restrict to individuals aged 10 years old or more in 2009 and alive by 2010. We retrieve their socio-

demographic and health information from 2004 to 2010 and define a variable equal to 1 if they had at least one mental-health visit within the past 3 years. We then use a logit model – since the dependent variable is binary – that includes the following variables: a female indicator, the year, deciles of age, indicator for foreign-born, the marital status the year before, the marital status two years before, number of children one and two years before (one indicator per value), employment status one year before, deciles of transfers received one year before, a set of indicators if a child has died within the last five years and was aged between 0-10 years, 11-20 years, etc., fixed effects for the municipality of residence one year before, deciles of wage one and two years before. The total number of observations is 7,813,589 (3,950,508 individuals) and the pseudo- $R^2$  reaches 7.4%.

We use an alternative model where we predict the probability to have at least one mentalhealth visit in year three before the crime (to be as far as possible from the event) using our full sample of non-confession crimes processed between 2006 and 2014. This alternative model may better predict mental health since it is based on a sample of offenders but at the expense of using the same sample to train and test the model.We use a logit model as well, where we include the following variables: a female indicator, dummies for each age value, dummies for each age-atcrime value, indicator for foreign-born, indicator for married the year before the crime, dummies for each number of children the year before the crime. dummies for each year of education value one year before the crime, number of hours worked and monthly wage month 36 before the case decision, indicator equal to one if ever suspect or charged in the last 3 years before the case decision, number of supsected crimes and charges in the last 3 years before the case decision, indicator equal to one if ever suspect in years t-2 to t-5 before the year of the crime. In that case, the number of observations is equal to 35,363 and the pseudo- $R^2$  to 12.3%. Table correlates both measures with each other, and with the actual probability of having at least one mental health visit in year three before the case decision. The correlation lies between 0.3 and 0.53. We also reproduce Figure A5 with the second measure (based on our sample directly) and results are very similar.