Vincent THEROUDE

▬▬▬ Current Positions

2019 – ... **Postdoctoral research fellow** at *IESEG School of Management* and at *Université de Lille*

Member of Lille Economie Management (LEM), UMR 9221

Member of the INDUCED team

https://sites.google.com/site/inducedproject/

Contact Information

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▬▬▬ Previous education

2014–2019 **Ph.D in Economics**

Université de Lyon

Rules and efficiency in collective choices: an experimental approach.

Advisors: Stéphane Robin (CNRS) & Adam Zylbersztejn (Université de Lyon)

Jury Members: Oliver Armantier (New York FED), Agnès Festré (Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis), Penelope Hernández (Universitat de València), Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS)

Short abstract In my thesis, I review and develop the state of knowledge on the public good game through three contributions. In the first chapter, I conduct the first literature review aiming at analyzing how agents that differ either (i) in initial endowment or (ii) in public good return manage to cooperate. In the second chapter, I study theoretically and experimentally the effect of environmental risk (in addition to strategic risk) on the level of cooperation. In the third chapter, I propose and experimentally test a competition-based mechanism for developing public goods in situations where no central authority can intervene. The overall objective of this thesis is to study how different agents *ex ante* or *ex post* manage to cooperate.

2013–2014 MASTER in Econometrics with high honors

Université Lumière Lyon II

Disseration: *A new measure of locus of control*

Research

Field of Interest	Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, Social dilemmas, Decision Theory

Research Projects

Publication in peer-reviewed journal

[1] Théroude, V. & Zylbersztejn, A. (2018). *Cooperation in a risky world*

Short Abstract The return on the public good is often unknown at the time of the contribution decision. In this paper, we study experimentally the effects of an environmental risk (which affects the return of the public good) on cooperation. We implement two treatments with risk: in one treatment, the risk is individual; while in the other, the risk is collective. The level of cooperation is roughly the same in these two treatments compared to the classical situation where the return on the public good is deterministic, homogeneous and publicly known. Therefore, environmental risk does not seem to affect cooperation.

Status: Published in *Journal of Public Economic Theory in 2021*

Work in progress - Working papers available

[2] Théroude, V. (2019). *Heterogeneity in Public Good Games: a survey* - Draft available upon request

Short Abstract Can heterogeneous agents achieve cooperation? To answer this question, I conduct a literature review that focuses on papers that use heterogeneous agents in linear public good games. I consider two categories of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in public good returns and heterogeneity in initial endowment. In the bulk of the papers studied, I find that heterogeneity in any form does not lead to a significant decrease in cooperation.

[3] Théroude, V. (2019). *Competition for the Greater Good: Does competition for a better access improve public goods provision?* - Draft available upon request

Short Abstract In this paper, I experimentally analyze the effects of competition on the provision of public goods. Agents compete - through their contributions - for privileged access to the public good (and thus a better return of the public good). Competition is effective in increasing contributions to the public good only when it does not create excessive inequalities.

[4] Aydogan, I. & Berger,L. & Théroude, V. (2021). *More ambiguous or more complex? Investigating Model Uncertainty in Ellsberg Urns* - Draft available upon request

Short Abstract We explore experimentally individual preferences under model uncertainty using Ellsberg two-color urns of different sizes. We find that both (i) preferences for risk over ambiguity and (ii) preferences among different ambiguous situations do depend on the size of the urns considered. Overall, our results highlight the importance of considering the structure of model uncertainty for comparing different uncertain situations.

<u>Other projects</u>

[5] Suchon, R. & Théroude, V. (2020). *Inequality and cooperation: meta-analytical evidence from the PGG*

Short Abstract In this project, we have collected data from 25 published experiments on public goods games in which heterogeneity in initial endowment is introduced. The objective is to measure in a meta-analysis the effects of initial endowment inequalities on public goods provision. We then analyze individual contributions and discuss the ability of standard social preference models to explain the relative contributions of "poor" and "rich" participants.

[6] Berger, L. & Théroude, V. (2020). *On the determinants of altruistic behaviour in a risky context*

Short Abstract In this project, we study the interaction between (i) risk and ambiguity preferences and (ii) social preferences. To do so, we implement a dictator game where participants play with a charity association. The amount transferred to the charity is either multiplied or lost. We vary the probability of loss in order to study the whole domain of probabilities. Our design allows us to distinguish between the effect of preferences and the effect of strategic behavior.

[7] Mimra, W. & Théroude, V. (2020). *The limits of fair meritocracy*

Short Abstract A predominant ideal of equity is meritocratic equity, which regards income inequalities as fair if they reflect only differences in performance. However, this ideal ignores several key features of the real world: first, individuals are heterogeneous both in terms of their abilities and their general circumstances. These two elements determine income, and they may be interdependent. Second, policymakers often lack complete information about how income is generated. The goal of this project is to provide a theoretical framework and test experimentally how different levels of information about the type of heterogeneity affect views about equity and willingness to redistribute.

[8] Neimitz J., Rasch A., Théroude, V. & Waibel C. (2021). *Rationalization and prioritization in healthcare markets: Which motives drive physicians' treatment choices?*

Short Abstract In health economics, it is often assumed that medical personnel are altruistic. However, few empirical studies have tested this hypothesis. In this project, we use experimental economics to study the social preferences of future physicians. Precisely, 83 medical students were asked to make a series of decisions involving a trade-off between their wealth level and the wealth level of one or more patients. We find considerable heterogeneity in the social preferences of our sample.

Conferences

2022 **MUSEES Conference** at Lyon (France). *More ambiguous or more complex? Investigating Model Uncertainty in Ellsberg Urns.*

2022 **ADRES Conference** (Online). *More ambiguous or more complex? Investigating Model Uncertainty in Ellsberg Urns.*

2021 **ASFEE Meeting** at Dijon (France). *Inequality and cooperation: meta-analytical evidence from the PGG.*

2021 **ESA Meeting Around the Clock**. *Inequality and cooperation: meta-analytical evidence from the PGG.*

2018 **ASFEE Meeting** at Nice (France). *A competition for the Greater Good: introducing a tournament logic in public goods provision.*

2017 **World ESA Meeting** at San Diego (United States of America). *Cooperation in a risky world.*

2016 **European ESA Meeting** at Bergen (Norway). *Cooperation in a risky world.*

2015 **Fourth Lyon Toulouse Behavioral and Experimental Economics workshop**. *Cooperation in a risky world.*

Research Seminar

2021 **Anthropo-lab Seminar**. *A competition for the Greater Good: introducing a tournament logic in public goods provision.*

2019 **Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar - GATE Lyon**. *A competition for the Greater Good: introducing a tournament logic in public goods provision.*

2018 **Cortex Student Club** - **Labex Cortex** - **Université de Lyon**. *Cooperation in a risky world.*

2017 **Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar - GATE Lyon**. *Cooperation in a risky world.*

2017 **Research Seminar of Université Laval**. *Cooperation in a risky world.*

2016 **Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar - GATE Lyon**. *Cooperation in a risky world.*

Research Visit

2017 **Université Laval (Canada)** during 6 months

Advisors Charles BELLEMARE (Full Professor) and Sabine KRÖGER (Full Professor)

Fellowship EXPLO'RA DOC Fellowship

Grants

2019 Call for fundings LEM (UMR 9221): 2000€- allows to run more experiments of *Competition for the Greater Good: Does competition for a better access improve public goods provision?*

2020 Call for fundings LEM (UMR 9221): 2000- allows to run experiments of *The limits of fair meritocracy*

2021 Call for fundings LEM (UMR 9221): 2000€- allows to run experiments of *The limits of fair meritocracy*

Referee reports

Revue d'économie du développement, *Revue francaise d'économie politique*

Teaching Experience

2021 – 2022 Course coordinator, **IESEG School of Management**
Advanced Econometrics

2020 – 2021 Flipped classroom, **IESEG School of Management**
Microéconomie avancée (evaluation by students: 4.8)

2019 – 2020 Flipped classroom, **IESEG School of Management**

MacroEconomc Indictors and Policies (evaluation by students: 4.3)

2017 – 2019 **Full-time teaching fellow (ATER) in economics**, *Université Lumière Lyon II*

Microeconomics 1st year

Macroeconomics 1st year

Macroeconomics 3rd year

Methodology 1st year

2015–2017 Tutorials at **Université Lumière Lyon 2**:

Microeconomics 1st year

Macroeconomics 1st year

IT and Languages

Languages English (Fluent)

French (Native)

Spanish (Intermediate)

Software Stata, LaTeX, zTree, Qualtrics, oTree

References

Reference 1 **Dr. Adam ZYLBERSZTEJN**   *zylbersztejn@gate.cnrs.fr*

Reference 2 **Dr. Loïc BERGER**   *l.berger@ieseg.fr*

Reference 3 **Dr. Wanda MIMRA**   *w.mimra@ieseg.fr*

Reference 4 **Pr. Marie Claire VILLEVAL**   *villeval@gate.cnrs.fr*

Reference 5 **Pr. Bernard FORTIN**   *bernard.fortin@ecn.ulaval.ca*